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Examining a Comparative Law Myth:
Two Hundred Years of Riparian
Misconception
Andrea B. Carroir
Jn this Article, Andrea B. Carroll inquires whether npan'ans on a nonnavigable lake

(J)have mutual n'ghts to access the entire surface of the lake or, rather, (2)merely have the
limited n'ght to access the portion of the surface overlying the bed they respectively own
Canvll observes that the resolution of this question depends almost entirely on the state in wh1d1
the parties litigate and that most Anlen"can junsdictions use one of two approaches: the so
called "common law approach" or the so-called "civz1 law approach." Ca/Toll argues that coUJ1s
that accept the distinction between the common law and the civil law approaches are
perpetuating a false choice, because the "ciVJ1 law role" is not actually a role of the civzl law at
all. It is, instead, the relatively modem and spontaneous generation ofone Europeanjurisdktion
in response to peculiar policy choices. 'JJze role of civil law is exactly the same as that of the
common law; indeed, the common law role has civilian roots. Carroll /Urther asseJts that the
United States Supreme CoUJ1 made an error of interpretation over one hundred years ago that
brought this distorted distinction into Amen'can junsprudence and that courts throughout the
cowitry have perpetuated the error. In this Article, Carroll demonstrates that there are not. in
fact, diveigent civil and common Jaw mies of npanan access, and she encourages courts to
change the nomenclature to correct the persistent error.
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[T]hc great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie
dclibcrate, contr ived, and dishonest-but the myth
1
pcrsistent, persuasive , and unrealistic.

The purported differences between the common and civil law
systems are legendary.

Battles have raged for centuries on both

academic and political fronts over these differences.

Hostilities have

grown so intense that complete censorship once took hold; the study of
I.

Commencement Address at Yale University, PUB. PAPERS 470 (June 11, 1962)

<speech of President John F. Kennedy).
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the civil law, particularly Roman law, for example , was once banned in
England.2 Even today, in "mixed jurisdictions" such as Louisiana and
Quebec-heavily influenced by the Anglo-American common law, yet
with a largely "civilian" body of private law3-wars are being waged by
various groups to prevent further perceived intrusion by foreign
systems.4

The parties involved in these disputes view the stakes as

high. The differences between the common and civil law systems are
perceived to be so great that acceptance by a staunch believer of one
system of the other's validity or desirability is nearly inconceivable.
The reality as we move further into the twenty-first century, though, is
that the two systems are coming together much more closely. Many of
the supposed differences between them-particularly that they involve
diametrically opposed substantive rules-are mere myths.

A pertinent example of such a myth has presented itself recently.
Specifically, this long-debated question of the degree to which the
common and civil law systems differ has come to a head on
relating to water rights.

an

issue

That water presents itself as a battleground

here is perhaps not too surprising; waters and fighting have long been
closely associated.5 One need only glance at etymology to understand
the pervasiveness of the connection. The words "rivals" and "rivalry"
are derivatives of ancient words relating to waters , specifically, the
Roman word

"n·ve," which referred to riparian landowners.6 Fifteen

centuries have not brought much change; use of rivers and lakes
remains a hotly contested issue. Professional anglers participating in
fishing tournaments have been shot at by angry riparian landowners in
both Alabama and Louisiana.1

And a new controversy is currently

See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNEIT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 302
2.
(5th ed., Little Brown & Co. 1956) (1929).
3.

See T.B.

Smith,

The Preservation

of the Civilian

Tradition in

"Mixed

Jun'sdictions': in CIVIL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 3, 10 (Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos ed.,
1965).
4.

See Jose Trias Monge, Legal Methodology in Some Mixed Jurisdictions, 78 TuL.

L. REV. 333, 333 (2003); William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions:

Common Law

v.

Civil Law

(Codified and Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REv. 677, 737-38 (2000).
Mark Twain is even claimed to have remarked, "Whisky's fer drinkin', water's fer
But see John R. Brown, "Miskys fer Drinkin'; ffilter8 fer Fightin'!" Is It?
Resolving a Collective Action Dilemma in New Mexico, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 185, 186 n.3
(2003) (questioning the propriety of the attribution).
See Samuel C. Wiel, Origin and Comparative Development of the Law of
6.
U'lltercoU1Ses in the Common Law and in the Civil Law, 6 CAL. L. REV. 245, 255 n.46 ( 1918);
see also ROMAN WATER LAW 90 (Eugene F. Ware trans., 3d ed. 1985) (defining "rivals" as
''two persons who lead water through the same channel" (quoting DIG. 43.20.1.26 (Ulpian,
Edict, bk. 70))).

s.
.
fightm."'

See Sports Briefs, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Jan. 7, 2004, at SD; Shooting
7.
Shocks BASS Angler, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, June 4, 2004, at B l .
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brewing in courts across the nation among riparian landowners that
purportedly involves both the common law and the civil law, and
serves as an interesting context within which to study the true
differences between the t wo systems.
The question is essentially one of riparian access to water for
nonconsumptive purposes. In other words, do riparian landowners8 on
a nonnavigable lake have mutual rights to access the entire. surface of
the lake for fishing and boating, or are they limited to accessing that
portion of the surface overlying bed they own?9 The resolution of this
question depends almost entirely on the state in which the parties
litigate. Most American jurisdictions that have considered the question
have chosen one of t wo approaches:

the so-called "common law

approach" or the so-called "civil law approach."
The truth is that these courts are perpetuating a false choice.

In

fact, the "civil law rule" adopted by at least six of our states' high
courts is not actually a rule of the civil law at all.
relatively modem and

It is, instead, the

spontaneous generation of one European

jurisdiction in response to peculiar policy choices. The rule of civil
law is exactly the same as that at common law; indeed, the so-called
"common law rule" has civilian roots. But the United States Supreme
Court made an error of interpretation over one hundred years ago that
pulled a distorted rule into American jurisprudence and falsely
attributed it to civilian sources.

That error has been perpetuated by

courts around the countr y ever since.
The goal of this Article, then, is to demonstrate that there are not
divergent civil and common law rules of riparian access.

Part I will

provide a brief example of the context that gives rise to the problem of
riparian surface access to nonnavigable lakes for recreational or
nonconsumptive purposes10 and then detail the two major divergent
8.

The word "littoral" more correctly applies to the description of property abutting

a lake, while the word "riparian" technically refers only to property abutting rivers.

IA

GEORGE W THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 259, at

311 (Replacement 1980).

Nowadays, though, "riparian" is generally used to refer to both

types of property. Id

9.

The issue is only controversial when its application is restricted to water bodies

that state laws deem nonnavigable.
navigability are open to public use.

In most states, waters that meet state definitions of
See A. WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 85-87 (1984);

DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND REsOURCES § 8 . 28, at 8-45 to -52 (2002

& Supp.

2005). If members of the general public are entitled to access and make nonconsumptive
uses of the waters of these navigable bodies, a fortiori, riparian landowners may do the same.

�

It is only ove � nonnav gable waters, for which state law generally imposes no right of public
.
use, that the nghts of npanan landowners to use water are questionable.
This Article �onsiders only the gulf between the t wo primary approaches to
1 0.
.
.
resolvmg disputes regarding nonconsumptive uses such as fishing, boating, swimming, and
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approaches to solving this problem. Part II will then trace the history
of the two approaches. It will demonstrate that the "civil law rule" is
not, in fact, civilian at all; indeed, both the common and civil law rules
came from the same source. Instead, the so-called "civil law rule" is a
distortion that was imported into the United States erroneously and has
been perpetuated by our appellate courts for centuries. Finally, Part III
will offer a proposal for changing the nomenclature, and most
importantly, provide some observations about why it is important that
courts and legal scholars correct this 200-year-old mistake.
I.

A TIMELY CONTEXT FOR REAPPRAISING THE DIFFERENCES

BETWEEN CIVIL AND COMMON LAW SYSTEMS
A.

The Problem ofSurface Access to Nonnavigable ltater Bodies

The Connecticut Supreme Court is the latest in a long string of
state high courts to have decided a case that presents just the sort of
controversy that spawned the historical error.11 Ace Eqwpment Sales,
Inc. v. Buccino involved a dispute between two riparian owners on a
nonnavigable lake.12 The plaintiffs, including two recreational fishing
clubs, were owners of ninety-nine percent of the bed of a twenty -acre
manmade lake.13 They stocked the lake and used it for recreational
fishing. Defendants, the Buccinos, owned almost none of the bed of
the lake, but owned the property on which the dam controlling the lake
was erected. 15 After the Buccinos began granting permission to a fly
fishing club to use the lake, the plaintiffs constructed a twelve-foot
high fence along the lake's border.16 The intent was clearly to prevent
use by the defendant-riparians. The plaintiffs filed suit, seeking an
injunction to prevent the Buccinos and their guests from "trespassing"
on the water.11
14

bathing. There are significant divisions among jurisdictions in resolving questions of the
entitlement of landowners to make consumptive uses of lakes, e.g., for irrigation. The
doctrines adopted for those scenarios-most notably, the riparian landowner rights and prior
appropriations doctrines-are discussed exhaustively elsewhere and are beyond the scope of
this work. See, e.g., Joseph W Dellapenna, The Law of�ter Allocation in the Southeastem
States at the Opening ofthe Twenty-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LiTILE ROCK L. REV. 9 (2002).
11.
See Ace Equip. Sales, Inc. v. Buccino, 869 A.2d 626, 637 (Conn. 2005).
12.
Id at 628.
13.
Id at 628-29.
14.
Id
15.
Id at 629. There was some dispute as to whether the Buccinos owned any
.
portion of the lake bed at all. The Connecticut Supreme Court remanded to the trial court to
resolve this factual question. Id at 637 n.14.
16.
Id at 629.
17.
Id

TULANE LA W REVIE W
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Essentially, the plaintiffs argued that because they owned nearly
the entire bed of the lake, they were entitled to exclude others from the
water overlying that bed.18 The Buccinos, in contrast, urged that their

fellow riparian landowners on a nonnavigable lake had no right of
ownership in the water and that, as owners of land abutting a lake, they
were entitled to make recreational use of those waters, even when
covering bed owned by another. 19
The trial court ruled for the Buccinos, finding that "owners of
land abutting a nonnavigable body of water have riparian or littoral
rights that are not dependent on the genesis of the body of water as
artificial or natural, or on the ownership of the subaqueous land."20
The Connecticut appellate court agreed, f inding case law in Minnesota
and Michigan instructive.21

Both Minnesota and Michigan allow all

riparian owners to access the entirety of the surface of nonnavigable
lakes, "provided such use is reasonable and does not unduly interfere
with the exercise of similar rights on the part of other abutting owners
... regardless ... of the ownership of bed thereof."22

Thus, the

plaintiffs were required to remove their fence and allow the Buccinos
access.23
In April 2005, though, the Connecticut Supreme Court rendered a
decision reversing the trial and appellate court rulings and granting the
plaintiffs the exclusive use of the waters above lakebed they own.24 It
is this decision that highlights the controversy these facts present with
regard to the differences between the common law and the civil law.
The Connecticut Supreme Court correctly pointed out that most state
courts that have considered similar questions label the rule of free
access proffered by the Buccinos, but rejected by the court, as the
"civil law rule," and that urged by the plaintiffs as the "common law
rule."25 Whether other state high courts will ultimately make similar
decisions to adopt the "common law rule" remains to be seen.
Appellate courts around the

18.

country

are quite sharply divided on this

Id at631.

Ace Equip. Sales, Inc. v. Buccino, 848 A.2d 474, 478-79 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
rev� 869 A.2d 626 (Conn. 2005).
19.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id at477-78.
See id at480.
Id (quoting Flynn v. Beigel, 102 N.W2d 284, 290-91

Sec id at 482.

(Minn . 1960)).

Ace Equip. Sales, Inc. v. Buccino, 869 A.2d 626 (Conn. 2005).
25.
Id at 34-35.
nnecti cut co
of appeals purposefully avoided this issue,
. .
.
noting
that it did . not perceive this case as reqmnng a choice between the application
of 'civil
law' or 'common law."' Buccino, 848 A.2d at 479 n.1 O.

�

�e C:O

�
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issue; before Buccino, the high courts of at least six states had thus far
chosen the "civil law rule," and at least six the "common law rule."26

B.

The Solution Articulated byAmencan Courts: A Choice
Between the "Common Law Rule " and the "Civil Law Rule"

1.

The "Common Law Rule"
The so-called "common law rule" is easy to understand.

merely a logical extension of the familiar Latin maxim

It is

c4jus est

solum7 ejus est usque ad crelum et ad inferos, meaning "[t]o whomever
the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the depths."21 Under
this rationale, a landowner's right to property is understood "to extend
from heaven to hell."28 The common law rule regarding access to the
surface of nonnavigable lakes, then, is consistent with concepts of
absolute ownership. 29 An owner "is entitled to exclusive dominion
over his land, including the areas above and below its surface."30
That right to exclusive dominion does not cease merely because
the privately owned land is covered by water. The landowner has the
right to the exclusive use and control of everything above and below
his land, including the waters lying immediately above his bed.

In

essence, the common law rule treats the waters overlying privately
26.

See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 234 (3d ed. 1997). Compare

Duval v. Thomas, 114 So. 2d 791, 791 (Fla. 1959); Beacham
Ass'n, 526 N.E. 2d 154, 154

(Ill.

v.

Lake Zurich Prop.

Owners

1988); Burt v. Munger, 23 N.W2d 117, 120 (Mich. 1946);

Johnson v. Seifert, 100 N.W.2d 689, 689 (Minn. 1960); State Game & Fish Comm'n v. Louis
Fritz Co., 193 So. 9, 9 (Miss. 1940); and Botton v. State, 420 P.2d 352, 352 (Wash. 1966)
(adopting the civil law rule), with Wehby v. Turpin, 710 So. 2d 1243, 1243 (Ala. 1998);
Medlock v. Galbreath, 187 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Ark. 1945); Lanier v. Ocean Pond Fishing Club,
Inc., 322 S.E.2d 494, 494 (Ga. 1984); Sanders v. De Rose, 191 N.E. 331, 333-34 (Ind. 1934);
Baker v. Normanoch Ass'n, 136 A.2d 645, 645 (N.J. 1957); andSmoulter v. Boyd, 58 A 144,
147 (Pa. 1904) (adopting the common law rule).

It is likely that only thirteen state supreme courts have yet decided this question because
of the interplay between issues of surface access and navigability. States (such as C alifornia)
which adopt a very expansive, recreation-based test of navigability (in lieu of the traditional
commerce-based test), are much less likely to confront the surface access question. See, e.g.,
Nat'! Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 720 n.17 (Cal. 1983) ("A waterway usable
only for pleasure boating is ... a navigable waterway . . . ."). The navigability of the water
body would provide all riparian landowners with surface access, without the need for
consideration of the civil or common law rule. Id at 719-20; TARLOCK, supm note 9, § 8.28,
at 8-45 to -52.
27.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 378 (6th ed. 1990); accord Russ VERSTEEG,
EssE� LATIN FOR LAWYERS 127 (1990); see also Clement L. Bouve, Private Ownership
of
Airspace, 1 AIR L. REv. 232, 244 (1930) (tracing the origins of cqjus est so/um).
28.
GETCHES, supra note 26, at 234.
29.
Id
30.
1 s.v CIRIACY-WANTRUP ET AL., WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 52 (Robert Emmet
Clark ed., 1967).
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owned lakebed as if they were dry land.31 Thus, the common law rule
finds that one riparian landowner crossing the boundary lines by
steering his boat into water overlying bed owned by another riparian
landowner, or indeed merely casting a fishing line into water overlying
bed owned by another, commits a trespass.32
The beauty of the rule is in its consistent application. Under the
common law rule, a landowner is entitled to insist upon exclusive
dominion, applied both to
those lands.33

dry land and to

any waters that might cover

It follows that under this rule, the right to make

nonconsumptive or recreational uses of the waters of nonnavigable
lakes lies solely in the owner of the bed immediately beneath that
water.34
Pennsylvania's application of the rule is illustrative. In the 1904
case of Smoulter

v.

Boyd, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court resolved a

controversy between two landowners bordering a nonnavigable lake
about one mile long and one-half mile wide.35 The plaintiffs sued a
defendant who owned approximately 215 acres of land, including the
bed of and all of the land surrounding the lake, with the exception of
about five acres.36 P laintiffs owned the other five acres of land, which
included about one and one-quarter acres of bed.37

Approximately

eight years after purchasing the property, the defendant "built a boom
of heavy logs fastened together at the ends by iron links, and thereon
erected a barbed wire fence across the surface of the lake."38 The boom
followed the boundary lines of defendant's property, and sought to
exclude other riparian landowners on the lake from fishing or boating
over any portion of bed owned by the defendant.39 The minority bed
owners sought an injunction ordering defendant to remove the boom
and allow free surface access to all riparian landowners "for the
purposes of boating and sailing.'"'0

31.
Recent Cases, Water.s and Watercourses-Non-Navigable Lakes-Right of [Jse
in Bed Owners, 26 MINN. L. REv. 569, 570 ( 1 94 1 - 1 942).
32.
James W Cullis, Note, Extent ofPdvate Rights in Nonnaviga ble Lakes, 5 U. FLA.

L. REv. 166, 176 (1952).

33.
Joseph B. Gaudet, ftHlter Recreation--Public Use of''Pn'vate" i-Yaters, 52 CALL
REv. 1 7 1 , 174 (1964).
34.
Id
35.
36.
37.

58 A. 144, 1 44-45 (Pa. 1904).
Id at 145.
Id

38.
39.

Id
Id

40.

Id at 145-46.

(internal quotation omitted).
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In analyzing the respective rights of the parties

to make

nonconsumptive uses of the surface of the lake, the Pennsylvania court
first noted that the defendant's deed to a portion of property including
the bed of the lake "gave him title ad crelum et ad inferos, and hence
the waters on his land were subject to his use and enjoyment."'11 The
court viewed the plaintiffs' boating and swimming activities on the
defendant's property as trespasses, just as if that property were dry
land.42

Any use of the defendant's property by an unauthorized

person-even a fellow riparian landowner for the purpose of boating
or fishing-was held to be "an infringement of the rights of property
vested in the owner of the land."43

The court, therefore, found the

defendant to be within his rights in erecting the boom, and denied the
plaintiffs' request for an injunction.44
In the century since Smoulter, the courts of a number of other
states have used the principle cz!fus est solum to come to the same
conclusion:

a riparian landowner on a nonnavigable lake may make

nonconsumptive uses of the water only above bed he owns.45 Cujus est
solum is the antithesis of a rule of free surface access for all riparian

landowners. As applied to water bodies, it protects the landowner's
exclusive dominion in his property as if it were dry land, for the
landowner's rights extend to anything found above or below the
surface of that land.
The "Civil Law Rule"

2.

The so-called "civil law rule" is quite the opposite. It rejects the
principle ClljUS est solum and instead embraces free access for all
riparian landowners.46

While the rule admits the existence of a

"technical trespass," it sanctions that result in favor of the sharing of
waters in which the parties have a common interest.41

Simply stated,

the civil law rule permits a riparian landowner "to use the surface of
the entire lake for fishing, boating, and bathing as long as he does not
41.

Id at 146.

42.

Id at 147.

43.

Id

44.

Id

45.

See, e.g., Medlock v. Galbreath, 187 S.W2d

HENRY

P. FARNHAM, THE LAW

OF WATERS AND WATER

545, 546 (Ark. 1 945); sec also 2
RIGHTS§ 375, at 1383 (1904) ("An

e�cl�sive right of fishery in the water adjacent to property is not one of the rights of the
npanan owner. He can claim such a right only when he owns the soil Wlder the water ....");
Recent Cases, supra note 31, at 570 (citing some jurisdictions' dispositive use of
the
principle).
46.
47.

Cullis, supra note 32, at 176.
SceCIRACY-WANTRUPET AL., supra note 30, at

54; Cullis, supra note 32, at 176.
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unduly interfere with the rights of the other [riparian landowner]
proprietors."48
American courts adopting this civil law rule often give no real
justification for their choice.49

Occasionally though, state courts

espouse one of four common reasons for departing from traditional
notions of an owner's right to exclusive dominion above and below his
land:

(1) the common law rule is too difficult to follow with regard to

lakes;50 (2) there can be no private ownership in the waters or in the
fish of a nonnavigable lake and, thus, use of the surface should be open
to all riparian landowners;51

(3) common use of the surface of

nonnavigable lakes is customary;52 or (4) economic policy requires the
adoption of the civil law rule.53

48.

Cullis, supra note 32, at 176.

49.

See, e.g., Burt v. Munger, 23 N.W2d 117, 119-20 (Mich. 1946); Botton v. State,

420 P.2d 352, 356 (Wash. 1966).
50.

Problems with detennining exact boundaries and developing a mechanism to

ensure a landowner's exclusive dominion in water overlying his bed are viewed as
insurmountable under this justification for a rule of free riparian landowner access.

See 1

CIRACY-WANTRUP ET AL., supra note 30, at 54. The trouble with detennining precise limits of
ownership inherent in surveying water bodies is certainly exacerbated when lakes are
involved. Particularly when the bed of a lake is divided among a number of riparian
landowners, it is not so simple as merely drawing a line down the middle, as with a river. The
problem of enforcement is inextricably tied to the difficulty of demarking clear Jines.

A

riparian owner fishing or boating on lake waters over bed he owns "could not be conveniently
arrested the moment he arrived at the medium filum aqu;e ex adverso of his land, or the
moment he traversed the boundaries." Mackenzie v. Bankes, (1878) 3 App. Cas. 1324, 132930 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.). Thus, the sheer difficulty of accurately applying cujus
est solum to nonnavigable lakes has persuaded some jurisdictions to adopt the "civil law
rule." See Cullis, supra note 32, at 177.
51.

The Mississippi Supreme Court offers this unpersuasive justification for adopting

the "civil law rule." See State Game & Fish Comm'n v. Louis Fritz Co., 193 So. 9, 11 (Miss.
1940). That any owner's land contains wildlife, which are things insusceptible of ownership,
should not justify public intrusion of the landowner's dominion solely for the sake of pursuit.
Such an intrusion without permission would be a clear trespass on dry land.
distinction simply because land is covered with water untenable.
52.

I find a

See id (favoring the "civil law rule" in order to respect a practice honored by the

people "for time out of mind").
53.
This is, in my view, the most persuasive and honest justification for adopting the
"civil law rule" given by American courts. It is also the most pragmatic. The fact is that
economic development may be stymied by the adoption of any rule other than one allowing
all riparian landowners access to the entire surface of the water body on which they border.
Unfortunately, far too few jurisdictions proffer such a reasonable explanation. In fact, Florida
and Minnesota are alone in admitting economic or public policy as the primary force behind
their adoption of the "civil law rule." See, e.g., Duval v. Thomas, 114 So. 2d 791, 795 (Fla.
1959); Recent Cases, supra note 31, at 570-71.

Florida has recognized that many of the

state's important recreational water bodies are relatively small lakes not accessible to the
general public, but that a significant volume of sporting activity essential to the state
economy, in particular water-skiing and sailing, is conducted on those "private" lakes. See
Duval, 114 So. 2d at 795. Preventing public use would simply place an unacceptable strain
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Some of these policies are certainly legitimate and may deserve
protection. The problem is that all too often, c? urts choose to ado�t
the civil law rule or the common law rule seemmgly because of their
labels, or because of the purported sources of the rules, rather than
because an exhaustive analysis of state goals points in a particular
direction. Jurisdictions considering whether to adopt a rule of free
riparian landowners access to nonnavigable lakes should consider the
above-articulated, and other, policies and develop a rule that best
protects the policies the particular jurisdiction deems important.55
They should not, however, refer to, or rely upon, incorrect labels or the
misguided impressions those labels give.
54

II.

A CRITICAL HISTORICAL REVIEW

The truth is that there is no dichotomy between the civil and
common law rules in this area. In other words, there is no civil law
rule that is different from a common law rule regarding riparian
landowners' surface access to nonnavigable lakes. The idea that there
are divergent common law and civil law rules is the result of an error
that is more than 200 years old. The rule of surface access was, in fact,
historically the same at both common and civil law. Specifically, the
rule was that a riparian landowner's access was limited to the surface
waters over his bed-a mere application of the principle cujus est
solum to land covered by water. The creation of a different civil law
rule can be traced to an identifiable point: a series of early nineteenth
century Scottish cases. That distortion of the rule was incorporated
into American jurisprudence by the United States Supreme Court, and
then further complicated by the Court through a series of errors in
interpreting its sources. This Part will explain the historical rule in
on an economy heavily dependent on tourism. See id at 791; Recent Cases, supra note 31, at

570-71. Similarly, Minnesota has taken the position that while its nonnavigable lakes cannot

be opened to the entire public in accordance with state definitions of navigability, they should
at least be made accessible to the greatest number of people possible.
supra note 31, at 570-71.
54.

See Recent Cases,

See, e.g., Wehby v. Turpin, 710 So. 2d 1243, 1249 (Ala. 1998) (adopting the

com mon law rule solely because Alabama is a "common law state") .
55.

States occasionally adopt both the civil and conunon law rules, depending upon

whether the lake at issue is natural or artificial or whether the bed is owned by virtue of a
deed or merely by virtue of the ownership of riparian landowner lands. Compare Duval, 114
So. 2d at 791 (adopting the civil law rule for natural lake), with Anderson v. Bell, 433 So. 2d
1202, 1202 (Fla. 1983) (adopting the common law rule for manmade lake); compare
Improved Realty Corp. v. Sowers, 78 S.E.2d 588, 592 (Va. 1953) (adopting the civil law rule
when bed is owned by virtue of ownership of riparian landowner lands), with Wickouski v.
Swift, 124 S.E.2d 892, 895 (Va. 1962) (adopting th e common law rule where bed ownership
is expressed in deed).
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both common and civil law jurisdictions, detail the point at which the
rules are supposed to have diverged, and set out how American cou11s
came to view the newly divergent rules as stenuning from the
differences in the common and civil law sy stems.
A.

The History ofthe "Common Law Rule"
The history of the common law rule of restricted access is,

essentially� the histor y of the development of the doctrine cujus est
solum-a

rule of civilian origin. It was the application of that doctrine

to cases involving water that gave rise to what came to be known as the
common law rule regarding riparian landowner access.

1.

Tracing the Origins of the Doctrine Cujus Est Sohun
a.

On the Continent: The Birth of a Doctrine

The history of the doctrine Cl!JUS est solum� ejus est usque ad
ca:Jum et ad inferos is indeed fascinating.
referred to

as

The doctrine is often

"one of the oldest rules of property known to the law,"'''

for quite good reason. While the maxim is most commonly bel ieved
to have originated with the well-famed seventeenth-century judge and
jurist Lord Coke,57 the tr uth is that it was around many, many centuries
before Coke popularized it in Britain.

Cujus est solum's origins can

actually be traced back to Roman times. It is likely a creation of the
twelfth-century

school of Roman

law

devotees known

as

the

Glossators.
Although recorded Roman legal history dates back as far as five
centuries B.C., perhaps the most important and widely c elebrated
development in Roman law is the completion of the sixth-century
compilations

at

the behest

of

Emperor

Justinian.58

Justinian

commanded a team of legal elites to develop a number of Roman law
works in the hopes of preserving the best of the classical Roman
literature from prior centuries and of providing a statement of the law
in force in his own day.59 His team proved quite prolific, producing a
number of important works of Roman law-most notably, Justinian's

56.
�e Howard H. Hackley, Trespassers in the Sky, 21 MINN. L. REV. 773, 774
(1937) (quoting Hannabalson v. Sessions, 90 N.W 93, 95 (1902)).
57.
See, e.g., Note, Trespass byAirplane, 32 HAR.v. L. REv. 569, 569 (1919).
58.
See GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS, THE HISTORICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF
ROMAN LAW 118, 395 (2003).
59.
Id. at 388.
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Digest60

crude "Code" by

913
modem

standards, Justinian's Digest has profound historical significance as
one of the earliest and most comprehensive collections of written law.61
The method of the Digestwas not to establish a wholly new law,
but merely to collect and detail the best surviving works of the Roman
Empire.62

Thus, the Digest took the form not of a scientifically

organized and s y stematized work, but rather of a compilation of the
writings of many legal scholars.63 Among the dozens of legal scholars
whose works were included in the Digest were the second-century
Roman jurists Paul and Venuleius.64
As groundbreaking as the Digestwas, its influence waned in the
centuries after its preparation. 65 Part of the problem was linguistic; the

Digest was written in Latin, and thus was inaccessible to later
generations of legal scholars, many

of whom read only

Greek.1'0

Further, legal scholars and practitioners began preparing their own
commentaries on the

Diges� which over time became more influential

than the Digestitself.61 Thus, Roman law fell into a period of decline
for nearly

600 y ears.

In the late eleventh century, though, scholar� in Pisa, Italy,
stumbled upon a manuscript of Justinian's

Digest68 The discovery

sparked a renewed interest in Roman law, prompting a number of legal
scholars to abandon their work on local law to focus on the

Digest69

One group of legal scholars in particular, the Glossators, came to
devote its life's work to commenting upon these newly discovered
Roman law works.10
The Glossators focused their attention primarily on Justinian's
sixth-century Digest 11
divine.12
60.
61.

For the Glossators, it was just beneath the

The Digest was considered intellectually superior to the
Id at 393.
Id at 395.

62.

See id at 388.
See id at 387; Peter Stein, Justinian's Compilation: Classical Legacy and Legal
Soun;e, 8 TuL. EUR. & Crv. L.F. 1, 1 ( 1 993).
64.
See HANS Juuus WOLFF, ROMAN LAW: AN HiSlDRICAL INTRODUCTION 1 1 9
63.

(1951); Stein, supmnote 63, at 1 .
65.
66.

MousoURAKis, supra note 58, at 402.
Id at 401 -02.

Id at 402.
67.
68.
Id at 423; see also PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 43 ( 1 999)
.
.
(d1scussmg the rediscovery of the Digest in Pisa).
69.
70.
71.

See MousoURAKis, supnmote 58, at 423.
See STEIN sup.ra note 68, at 45, 47.
See id at 47.

72.

Id at 46.

,
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contemporary works of the day, and, surprisingly, more suited to
serving the burgeoning mercantile economy in Italy.13

As such, the

Glossators came to view Justinian's texts as nearly perfect-free from
contradiction and sufficient for solving any legal problem that might
arise.74 The Glossators, therefore, directed their efforts at providing
cross-references to various provisions of Justinian's works, explaining
seemingly contradictory passages, and elaborating upon the texts. "s
The Glossators' works initially took the form of "interlinear glosses''
(and gave rise to the name by which the school would be known), but
eventually expanded to commentary in the margins of the texts of the
76
Digest
The most influential gloss was that prepared by Accursius
(perhaps the most famed member of the Glossators ' school) and
published (together with the original text of the Digest) around 1 23 5 . ''
With over 96,000 glosses,18 the Accursian Gloss was viewed as not
only thorough but also exceptional.
Gloss

was

"For centuries, the Accursian

the basis of any doctrine which claimed to be derived from

Roman law. The maxim came to be accepted that 'What the Gloss
does not recognise, the Court does not recognise."'19
The phrase cujus est solum was first used by Accursius in glosses
explaining two separate provisions of Justinian's Digest80

The first

passage is one penned by the Roman jurist Paul to describe the rights
of the owners of two estates between which lies some public property.81
Paul explained that the intermediate public property does not prevent
the landowners from establishing servitudes between them, such as
those regulating the height of their buildings.82
But this situation does prevent the existence of a servitude giving
a right to insert a beam or to have a roof or other structure proj ecting
from a building or to discharge a flow of rainwater or rainwater
dripping from the eaves of a house. The reason is that the air space
above such ground must be kept clear.83
73.
74.
75.
76.

MOUSOURAKis, supra note 58, at 423-24.
STEIN, supra note 68, at 46.
Id at 46-47.
Id at46.

77.
Id at 48; DITLEV TAMM, ROMAN LAW AND EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY
205
(Michael Murphy et al. trans., 1 st ed. 1997).
78.
79.

STEIN, supra note 68, at 48; TAAM, supra note 77, at 205.
STEIN, supra note 68, at 49.

80.
81.
82.

See J.M. SPATGHT, AIRCRAFT IN PEACE ANDIBE LAW 54 ( 1 9 1 9).
DIG. 8.2.1 (Paul, Edict, bk. 1).

83.

Id.

Id
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Digest was drafted by

the jurist Venuleius and explains the rights of landowners vis-a-vis
those acting "by force or stealth" on their land. 84
If someone overhangs a tomb with a projection or water drip, even
though it does not touch the tomb itself, an action can rightly be
brought against him, because it has been done by force or stealth to the
tomb. For the tomb is not only the place which receives the burial, but
all the sky above it; and for this reason an action can also be brought for
tomb violation. 85

Seven centuries after Justinian's
used

Digest was complete, Accursius

cujus est solum as an annotation to these passages,86 and the

maxim's long life began.

While the maxim arguably gives much

broader effect to the above-quoted passages than is necessary -some
even accuse Accursius of a tautology for the extreme breadth81-the
intent of the phrase is clear and gives some depth to an ancient and
fundamental tenet of property law :

a landowner has the "right of

freedom from interference in the use and enjoy ment of his land,"88 and
that right to enjoy without interference exists above and below the
ground owned as well. The ancient jurists quoted in Justinian's

Digest

expressed this freedom in the context of the right of a landowner to
complain about dripping water from a neighbor's constructs onto his
property or tomb.89 Accursius' vision of the concept, articulated with
the maxim

cujus est solum, merely acknowledges that the freedom of a

landowner extends beyond the interference of dripping and bey ond the
context of public property and tombs.90
84.
85.
86.

See DIG. 43.24.22.4 (Venuleius, Interdicts, bk. 2).
Id
See SPAIGHT, supra note 80, at 54; Bouve, supra note 27, at 244-48; Hackley,

supra note 56, at 777.
87.

See EUGENE SAUZE, LES QUESTIONS DE RESPONSABILITE EN MATr.ERE D' AVIATION

26 ( 1 9 1 6) ("Accurse . . . ne fait que commettre une tautologie . . . ."); Bouve, supra note 27, at
247 ("Accursius . . . is merely guilty of tautology.").
88.
Hackley, supra note 56, at 777.
89.

DIG. 43.24.22.14 (Venuleius, Interdicts, bk. 2).

90.

Given this historical backdrop, there is some debate over whether cujus est solwn

is truly a "Roman" rule.

See, e.g. , SPAIGHT, supra note 80, at 54; Bouve, supra note 27, at

243-46. Some suggest that any principle of law not found in the "Roman Code" (referring
primarily to Justinian's Digest and Institutes) is not one of Roman origin. See SPAIGHT, supra
note 80, at 54. Under this theory, then, a principle set out for the first time in the Accursian
Gloss on Justinian's works is not "Roman." I view the distinction as irrelevant. First, I

believe that Justinian's Diges� as modified by the Glossators and Commentators in the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, is the body of work most modem scholars have in mind
when th�y reference "Roman law."

It is, at least, the ius commune-ahnost universally

charactenzed as Roman law-that was widely received in Europe in the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries. SeeTAAM, supra note 77, at 203. Second, a principle originating with the
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The doctrine might have lived on only in the Accursian Gloss
were it not for the Glossators' tenacity. The Glossators were extremely
successful in contributing to the development and influence of the civil
law because they spread their teachings throughout Europe.91

In the

thirteenth century, they established a program at the University of
Bologna, the sole purpose of which was to spread the teachings of
Roman law.92

Accursius was a prominent faculty member at the

University of Bologna,93 but his son, Franciscus (also a prominent
jurist and eventual professor at the University of Bologna94), would
prove to play a greater role in disseminating the doctrine of

cujus est

solum outside of Italy.
b.

Crossing the English Channel: Cujus Est Solwn Finds a
Home in Great Britain

On his return from a visit to Bologna in 1273, the English king,
Edward I, persuaded Franciscus to accompany him back to England
and deliver lectures on Roman law at Oxford University.95 Franciscus
agreed, and worked for Edward I for nearly ten years, holding, among
other positions, that of consilian"us to the king, a position "of trust and
confidence close to the king's person."96 It is believed that Franciscus
passed his father's phrase on to his pupils and colleagues in England,
where the maxim became extremely popular,97 and that Franciscus'
lofty position and influence with the king explains "how and why the
English judges of Edward I came to accept as a principle of law the
maxim coined by" Accursius.98
Accursian Gloss is at worst a thirteenth-century barbarization of or extension of Roman law.
It is, in any event, a rule of civilian origin.
See TAAM, supm note 7 7 , at 203.
91.
92.

Bouve, supra note 27, at 246.

93.

Hackley, supm note 56, at 777.

94.

TAAM, supm note 77, at 205; Bouve, supra note 27, at 248.

95.
96.

Bouve, supm note 27, at 248; Hackley, supra note 56, at 777.
Bouve, supra note 27, at 248.

97.
98.

Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 4 1 F.2d 929, 934 (N.D. Ohio 1930).

�ouve, �upra note 27, at 248; see also Hackley, supm note 56, at 777 (discussing

.
the maxun m English cases). At least one scholar argues that the maxim cujus est solwn
originated not with Accursius, but with his fellow Glossator Gino da Pistoia. See LUIGI
MIRAGLIA, COMPARATIVE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 474-75 (John Lisle trans., Augustus M. Kelley
1 968) (1912) (stating that to determine the ownership of title to minerals beneath the soil's
surface, many scholars "invoke Roman law;' which they argue provides that the "owner

of the

soil is the owner of a column of air to heaven and of a column of earth to ' infemus ' but such

h

statements are a hyperbole invented by Gino da Pistoia and have no foundation in t e sources
Support for such a theory is waning, as it is backed by no documentarv

of Roman law").

evidence and is belied by notes showing the Accursian Gloss as the earliest discovered use
the phrase. See SPAIGHT, supm note 80, at 54.

�f
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While the maxim was developed and spread to England without
his assistance, it undoubtedly owes its survival there to Lord Coke. In
his influential Institutes ofthe Laws ofEngland, first published in the
early seventeenth century, Lord Coke, in defining and describing land
and all its appurtenants, noted "the earth hath in law a great extent
upwards, not only of water . . . but of ayre and all other things even up
to heaven; for cujus est solum cjus est usque ad crelum."99 After its
recognition in Coke's Institutes, the maxim was applied in two nearly
contemporaneous seventeenth-century English cases, also decided by
Lord Coke.100

In both Penroddocks Case and Eaten s Case, the

defendants' buildings were placed in such a way that their eaves
projected rainwater onto the plaintiffs ' land. 101 The court held, in each
case, that the projection gave rise to a good claim of nuisance for
which plaintiff was entitled to an injunction.102 Lord Coke offered the
following language in support of the nuisance finding in Eaten s Case.
"Also ctljus est solum, eyiis est usque ad crelwn . . . and by the
overbuilding upon part of the house of the plaintiffs, he has deprived
them of the air; also he has prevented them from building their house
" 3
higher . . . . 10
After its recognition by Lord Coke, cujus est solwn continued to
be a part of England's body of legal literature. Eminent common law
scholars such as Blackstone and Kent described and applied the
maxim in their commentaries on English property law. 104 And though
99.

1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND OR COMMENTARY UPON

LITTLElDN bk. I , § 4a, at 1 98 (19th ed. 1 853).
1 00.

See Penruddock's Case, ( 1 597) 5 Coke's Rep. l OO(b), I O l (a)-(b) (C.P.); Baten's

Case, ( 1 6 1 1 ) 9 Coke's Rep 53(b), 54(a)-(b); see also Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 41
F.2d 929, 934 (N.D. Ohio 1 930) (discussing the history of the maxim).
101.

Penruddock, 5 Coke's Rep. at l O l (a); Eaten, 9 Coke's Rep. at 54(a).
Penruddock, 5 Coke's Rep. at 1 02(b); Eaten, 9 Coke's Rep. at 54(b)-55(a).
1 03. Eaten, 9 Coke's Rep. at 54(a)-(b).
1 04. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1 8
( 1 766) (" Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad crelum, is the maxim o f the law, upwards;
1 02.

therefore no man may erect any building, or the like, to overhang another's land; and,
downwards, whatever is in a direct line between the surface of any land, and the center of the
earth, belongs to the owner of the surface . . . . So that the word 'land' includes not only the
face of the earth, but every thing under it, or over it."); 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 40 1 (O.W Holmes, Jr., ed., 1 2th ed. 1 873) ("Corporeal hereditarnents are
confined to land, which, according to Lord Coke, includes not only the ground or soil, but
every thing which is attached to the earth, whether by the course of nature, as trees, herbage,
and water, or by the hand of man, as houses and other buildings; and which has an indefinite
extent, upwards as well as downwards, so as to include every thing terrestrial, under or over
it." (footnotes omitted)).
Kent's use of the maxim is somewhat less surprising than Blackstone's, as Kent is often
considered a shameless borrower of civilian concepts. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Cowts

or

Tribunals? Federal Courts and the Common Law, 5 3 ALA. L. REV. 8 9 1 , 904 n.64 (2002);
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the maxim was not cited often in English jurisprudence until the mid
nineteenth century,105 by 1 884 English courts were "conceding that the
maxim was part of the common law of England."106
2.

The Doctrine's Lengthy (and Continuing) Life

The maxim was warmly received in the United States as wel l,
with its principle gaining recognition in �erican courts as ea�ly as
.
1 832.107 Cujas est solum has since been cited countless tunes m the
courts of virtually every state in a wide variety of contexts.108 It has
even been twice recognized by the United States Supreme Court
(though the extension of the doctrine to prevent alleged trespasses by
aircraft was rejected in both cases).109
In addition to being adopted by common law jurisdictions such as
England and the United States, cujus est solum found a home early on
in the modern civilian world. The first true codification of French law,
Napoleon's 1 804 Code civil, included a statement that "[p]roperty in
Charles L. B arzun, Note, Common Sense and Legal Science, 90 VA. L. REv. 1 05 1 , 1 05 8
(2004).
105. See Fay v. Prentice, (1 845) 1 3 5 Eng. Rep. 769, 77 1, 773 (C.P.); Swetland v.
Curtiss Airports Corp., 4 1 F.2d 929, 934 (N.D. Ohio 1 930) (same); see also Hackley, supra
note 56, at 779 (discussing the history of the maxim).
106. Hackley, supra note 56, at 78 1 (citing Wandworth Bd. of Works v. United Tel.
Co., (1 884) 13 Q.B. 904, 9 1 5).
107. See Winton v. Comish, 5 Ohio 477, 478 ( 1 832) ("He who owns a piece of land
. . . is the owner of everything underneath in a direct line to the center of the earth and
everything above to the heavens."). For an early American recognition of the maxim with full

use of the Latin phraseology, see Lyman v. Hale, 1 1 Conn. 1 77, 179 (Conn. 1 8 36).
108. See, e.g., Hannabalson v. Sessions, 1 1 6 Iowa 457, 461 (Iowa 1902) (finding
trespass in "thrust[ing]" fist across boundary line of another's property); Smith v. New Eng.
Aircraft Co., 170 N.E. 385, 3 8 8 (Mass. 1930) (finding technical trespass, but no inj unctive
relief granted, for aircraft flying over plaintiffs' property); Jones v. Vt. Asbestos Corp., 1 82 A.
291, 303 (Vt. 1936) (finding title to gold and silver mines).
109.

Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 799 (1972); United States v. Causby, 3 2 8 U.S. 256,

260-61 ( 1 946). Cujus est solum was and still is often criticized by both English and
American jurists as "grievously misunderstood and misapplied," particularly as it relates to

questions involving air space and developments in aviation. See, e.g., William M . Wherry &
Cyril Hyde Condon, Air Travel and Trespass, 68 U. S. L. REv. 78, 84 ( 1 934) (quoting ARNOLD
MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TIIE AIR 33 ( 1 st ed. 1 932)); see also John A. Eubank, The Doctni1e of
theAirspace Zone ofEffective Possession, 12 B.U. L. REv. 4 1 4, 4 1 7 ( 1 932) (discussing cujus
est solum in the context of forbidding aerial navigation over one's private property); George
E. Hise, Ownership and Sovereignty of the .Ali' or Air Space Above Landowner's Premises
with SpecialReference to Aviation, 1 6 IOWA L. REv. 1 69, 1 74-75 ( 1 93 1 ) (same). At least one
scholar has argued that the maxim "has no authority in English law. Only in so far as it has
been adopted as part of our law by the judges or by textwriters of a very special degree of
authority, need it concern us." Wherry & Condon, supra, at 84 (quoting McNair, supra, at
33). But whatever its origin or suitability to modern times, it can hardly be argued that the
principle behind the maxim is a part of the common law in both England and the United
States.
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the soil imports property above and beneath."1 10 Germany 's first major
codification, the

1 900 Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch, provided similarly:

"[T]he right of the owner of a piece of land extends to the space above
the surface and to the terrestrial body under the surface."1 1 1

Both

countries retain the principle in their current codifications. 1 12

The

maxim's homeland, Italy, has kept it.113 And civil law codifications in
Spain, Argentina , Japan , Switzerland, and many other countries also
include the principle. 1 14

In sum , the histor y of cujus est solum is the story of a civilian
maxim incorporated virtually worldwide, in both civil and common
law systems. Whether the doctrine is Roman or a mere "gloss" upon
or barbarization of Roman law, 115 it is civilian. And thus , the backbone
of the common law relating to airspace, subsurface minerals and
mines, and, most importantly for this discussion, water, is a Latin
maxim with its genesis in the civil law.

B

The Point ofDistortion: The Application ofCuj us Est Solum in
Scottish Uilter Cases
Nearly as quickly as the doctrine of

cujus est solwn spread across

the continents, it was applied in cases involving access to water. 1 16 And
it is in the maxim's application to this highly controversial area that the
discontinuity began.
As one would expect, as applied to cases involving access to the
surface of nonnavigable water bodies, the maxim has long provided
110. C. CIV. art. 552 (1804).
111. Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Jan. 1 , 1975 , 150 , as amended,
§ 905 (Ian S. Forrester et al. trans. , 1975).
112. See C. crv. Art. 552 (2006), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
htmJ/codes_traduits/code_civil_textA.htm; Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code]
Jan. 1, 1992, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBl] 3 , as amended, § 905 , avmlable at http://www.
gesetze.2me.net/bgb_!bgb_0929.htm; see also Bouve, supra note 27 , at 246 (discussing the
maxim in the French Civil Code); Hiram L. Jome, Property in the .Ali- as Affected by the
Airplane and the Radio, 62 AM. L. REV. 887 , 900 ( 1 928) (discussing the maxim in the French
and German civil codes).
113. See Eubank , supra note 109, at 416.
114. Id; Jome, supra note 112, at 900-01. The right of freedom from interference is
limited under the German and Swiss codifications of cujus est soluni to heights o r depths at
which the landowner has an "interest . . . in . . . prevention" or only "so far as the exercise of
the ownership requires." Jome , supra note 112, at 900-01. The basic principle, though, is
unchanged.
115. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
1 16. See, e.g., Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 528-30 (Pa. 1855) (finding no cause of
.
actton for mining company's operations on its own land which interfered with the supply of
percolating water to springs on the plaintiff's land; given the doctrine of cujus est solum' the
plaintiff was "justified in all that he did" on his own land).
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justification for the so-called common law r:ile. . Specifically, the
application of cujus est solum to such a scenano yields the result that
each riparian landowner is entitled to access only the surface of waters
overlying lakebed that he owns.

.
So, how did the so-called civil law rule come about? If cu1us est

solum applies plainly to grant a riparian landowner surface access to
waters overlying his bed alone, why have some American courts be�
pronouncing a rule of free riparian landowner acces � to the entire
.
surface of nonnavigable lakes? The rule of free access is said to come
from the civil law,1 11 but the civil law rule, as demonstrated above, is
actually cujus est solum.
The point of origin of the rule of free access, and more pointedly,
its divergence from the widely adopted rule cujus est solum, is, in fact,
identifiable. The rule of free access is actually not a civil law rule at
all, but rather the product of a series of eighteenth- and nineteenth
century Scottish cases. The Scots distorted the widely adopted rule of
litnited surface access and, in so doing, became the lone civilians to
recognize the right of a minority bed owner to fish, fowl, and boat over
the entire surface of a nonnavigable lake, despite his ownership of only
a portion of the bed.
Although the genesis of this Scottish rule might be traced back as
far

as

1 797, 118 the generally prevailing view among Scottish courts is

that the rule of free surface access first gained legitimacy with the
House of Lords ' 1 19 1 856 decision in Menzies

v.

Macdonald 120

The

water body around which the dispute in Macdonald centered was a
lake approximately two miles wide and eleven miles long.121

Two

barons owned the majority of the land surrounding the lake, but there
was

also a minority owner, General Macdonald, who owned property

1 1 7. See supra Part I.B.2.
1 1 8. Mackenzie v. Bankes, ( 1 878) 3 App. Cas. 1 324, 1 341 (H.L.) (appeal taken from

Scot.).

1 1 9. The House of Lords, though m�st commonly known as the high court of England,
_
was also the high
court of Scotland until a Supreme Court was created for the United
Kingdom in 2005. DAVID MAxwELL, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF SESSION 3 ( 1 980)
see

also Susanna F. Fischer, Playing Poohsticks with the BritJ�t;h Constitution ?
The Blair
Government's Proposal To Abolish the Lord Chancellor, 24 PENN. ST. lNT'L L. REv. 257, 26263 (2005). Although it was a primarily parliamentary body, it also exercised the functions
of
an appellate court. See MAxwELL, supra, at 3.

120. [1 856] L.R.H.L. Sc. 463, 463 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.)
1 2 1 . Id Scot�and �ollows the use rules of the United States in this regard.
Thus,
beca�e the lake at issue m Macdonald was nonnavigable, it
was not open to the general

public s use. 3 DAVID M . WALKER, PRINCIPLES OF SCOITISH
PRIVATE LAW 1 07 ' 1 08 (4th ed

1989).

.
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with a waterfront of only about 1200 yards.122 General Macdonald
claimed that his ownership of lands surrounding the lake, and of a
portion of the bed of the lake, entitled him to sail and fish not merely
on the waters of the lake over the bed he owned, but over the entirety of
123
the lake.
In essence, General Macdonald argued that he be
recognized as "on a footing of perfect equality" with the two barons, at
least for purposes of "boating, fishing, floating timber, and every other
use of which the lake was susceptible."124 Much to the barons ' chagrin,
General Macdonald also built a tavern on his lakefront property, and
invited its patrons to join him in sailing and fishing over the entirety of
the lake.125 The barons sued to enjoin General Macdonald from using
the waters of the lake over the bed they owned, and to stop him from
inviting his guests at the tavern to do so; they wanted a judgment
recognizing the rights of all lakefront owners to use only the waters
6
covering land within their boundaries. 12
The House of Lords denied the barons ' request for an injunction,
holding that the right of fishing and sailing over the entire lake flowed
naturally from the ownership of a mere portion of riparian landowner
land. 127 Thus, all riparian landowners, no matter their percentage share
of ownership, held full rights of surface access on the lake.

Those

rights to use the waters of the entire lake were not granted without
limitation though. The House of Lords recognized that where there is
more than one riparian landowner, judicial regulation may be required;
one riparian landowner may attempt to make more use of the water
body than that to which he is entitled.128 The court did not actually

122.
123.

Macdonald, (1 856) L.R.H.L. Sc. at463.
Id

1 24.

Id

125.
126.

Id at 464.
Id at 465.

127.

Id at 466.

1 28.

Id at 466, 473. As an illustration of a scenario that might give rise to a "right of

action for the regulation of the enjoyment," the Macdonald court offered the following
hypothet and commentary:
Suppose it were not possible for more than any given number of boats, say a
thousand, to be simultaneously engaged in fishing upon the lake, [one riparian
landowner] would be entitled to have five hundred so employed, and [another
riparian landowner] would be entitled to have five hundred so employed . . . . [One
riparian landowner] could not, by alienating to others, give a right to more than his
due share. But if he keeps within that limit [other riparian landowners have] no
right to complain.

Id

at 473. The House of Lords gives no indication of whether its solution to this hypothet

depends upon roughly equal percentages of bed ownership. If, for example, there were ten
.
owners mstead of two, on the same lake, would each owner be entitled to have 1 00 boats on
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engage i n any such 'judicial regulation," or quantify the rights of use
of each party. Rather, its judgment is limited to a declaration of the
right of all riparian landowners to access the surface of the entire lake.
Interestingly, the House of Lords neither articulated a rationale
for the rule it espoused in Macdonald, nor cited any authorities
implying such a rule. Yet it departed significantly from the application
of czljus est so/um and its typical result of limited surface access in
riparian landowners.
Nearly twenty years later though, in its
Mackenzie

v.

1 878 decision in

Bankes, the House of Lords further developed and

articulated the rationale behind the rule first laid out in Macdonald129
Mackenzie and Bankes owned neighboring lands along an eight-mile
nonnavigable lake. 130

Mackenzie's lands were situated near the west

and south sides of the water body, while Bankes owned land on the
north and southeast sides.131 At the southeast corner of the water body,
its width suddenly contracted substantially.132

A "narrow low-lying

ridge" in that area caused a significant increase in depth before the
lake widened out again further to the southeast of the ridge. 133 The
areas on either side of the ridge eventually came to be known
differently, with that on the northwest side of the ridge dubbed "Fionn
loch," and that on the southeast side of the ridge called "Dubh loch."134
Mackenzie made free use of the waters of Dubh lake (for fishing,
fowling, and boating) for more than thirty years without challenge.135
But in 1 876, Bankes stopped Mackenzie from fishing on Dubh lake,
arguing that, as riparian landowner proprietor of all of the land
surrounding Dubh lake, Bankes held the sole right to use the surface of
its waters. 136 Apparently Bankes had become concerned that fishermen
on Dubh lake would frighten the newly present deer on the lake's
banks, and therefore set aside his prior "neighborly" behavior of

the water, or would each owner's relative use of the water depend upon the percentage of the
bed to which he held title?
1 29.

Mackenzie v. Bankes, ( 1 878) 3 App. Cas. 1324, 1 324 (H.L.) (appeal taken from

Scot.).
1 30.

Id

131.

Id at 1 324-25.

132.

Id at 1325.

133.

Id

1 34.

Id

135.

Id At least one judge in

Bankes suggested

that, regardless o f its ruling as to

whether Bankes held the right to free access of the entire surface, he may have acquired a
right to the water by virtue of his lengthy possession. Id at 1 345.
1 3 6. Id at 1325.
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allowing surface access to the lake. 137 Mackenzie sued, arguing that he
and Bankes were riparian landowner proprietors on the same water
body. 138 As such, Mackenzie sought a judicial declaration that both he
and Bankes held a "joint right of boating, fowling, fishing, and
exercising all other rights in or over" the entire surface of the lake. 139
Finding that Fionn and Dubh were actually two different lakes,
the House of Lords dismissed Mackenzie's suit. 140 The court found that
Mackenzie, as a riparian landowner proprietor on Fionn only, had no
right to access the surface of a wholly separate lake. 141

The dispute

between Mackenzie and Bankes was resolved, and the opinion should
have ended with that finding. The House of Lords went on, though, to
engage in a relatively lengthy discussion of what the result might have
been had the lakes instead been one water body. 142 The digression is
important, though purely dicta, as it is perhaps the best articulation of
the rationale behind the Scottish rule of free riparian landowner
surface access.
Lord Selbome, voting with the majority in Mackenzie, best
explained

the

Scottish

rule

with

regard

to

surface

access

of

nonnavigable lakes. 143 He began by setting out the Scottish rules of bed
ownership.144

In the absence of title documents establishing the

contrary, a lake "surrounded by the land of a single proprietor" belongs
solely to that proprietor. 145 Thus, when one riparian landowner on a
nonnavigable lake owns the entirety of the riparian landowner land, yet
neither his deed nor anyone else's declares the owner of the bed of the
lake, the riparian landowner owns the entire bed.

When there are

multiple riparian landowners on one water body, the bed-"the solum
or fundus of the lake"-is owned "rateably" by all. 146

To determine

precise boundary lines, Scottish law calls for lines to be drawn from
the center of the lake to the boundaries of the proprietor's land, just as

1 37.

Id

1 3 8.

Id at 1 3 26.

1 39.

Id at 1 324.

140.

Id at 1 3 36.

141.

Id

1 42.

Id at 1 338.

1 43.

See id at 1 336, 1 340.

1 44.
1 45 .

Id

1 46.

Id

See id at 1 3 38.
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with a river. 147 This rule of ownership is widely held and is perfectly
148
consistent with traditional notions ofproperty law.
What makes Scottish law in this area a departure from the
mainstream, though, is the rule the Mackenzie court goes on to
articulate regarding surface access.

Lord Selbome continued, "for

reasons which may be presumed to be founded in part, if not wholly,
on the irregularity of configuration, frequent in lakes," Scottish law
does not apply the same rule with regard to the rights of "boating,
fishing, and fowling" on lakes. 149

Riparian landowners are not

constrained by the bed ownership rule when it comes to accessing the
surface of lakes. The rights of boating, fishing, fowling, or any other
surface activities "are to be enjoyed over the whole water space, by all
the riparian landowner proprietors in common, subj ect (if need be) to
judicial regulation."150
Selbome did not offer any further explanation of the rule of free
access other than that it is founded upon "the irregularity of
configuration"

of most

lakes.151

Lord

B lackburn's dissent

in

Mackenzie offered an expansion of the rationale behind this dicta
though. 152

Blackbum

noted

that

Scottish

law

(in

particular,

Macdonald) generally supports the idea that "surface rights, which
from their nature [cannot] conveniently be exercised except jointly
over the whole" lake, are to be viewed as held in common.153

The

Mackenzie court, then, offered the first justification for an emerging,
and divergent, Scottish rule:

the oddity in shape of lakes and the

inconvenience of limiting surface access.
Finally, in Menzies

v.

�ntwort/J,154 the Scottish courts had

occasion to engage in "judicial regulation" of the common surface
rights of multiple riparian landowners. The lake at issue in �ntworth
(Lake Rannoch) was the same as that involved in Macdonald, litigated
nearly fifty years prior. 155 This time, Menzies sued, requesting that a
court step in and provide the type ofjudicial "regulation" the House of

147.
148.

Id

1 49.
1 50 .
151.

Mackenzie, ( 1 878) 3 App. Cas. at 1 338.
Id
Id

1 52 .
1 53 .

See id at 1 340-50.
Id at 1 343.

See, e.g., GOLDFARB, supra note 9, at 94-95 (explaining that the same rule obtains
in the United States).

( 1 90 1 ) 3 s.c. 94 1 .
Likewise, Menzies acted as the plaintiff in both cases. Compare id
Macdonald, ( 1 856) L.R.H.L. Sc. 463, 463 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.).
1 54 .
1 55 .

v.

with Menzies
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Lords noted might be necessary in both Macdonald and Mackenzie.156
By the time of the

Utentworth decision, the number of riparian

landowners with land along Lake Rannoch had grown from three to
six (with the lake frontage owned by these riparian landowners varying
from about

1 50 yards to just over ten miles157), several hotels had been

built along the lake, and the number of boats using the lake had
increased from approximately nineteen to fifty-one.158 Menzies argued
that the increased activity was damaging, and even threatening to
destroy altogether, the trout fishing on the lake.159

He sought a

judgment limiting the number of boats on the lake to sixteen, allocated
among riparian landowners

according

to

their respective

lake

frontage.160
The Court of Session161 denied Menzies' request for intervention
and dismissed his suit.162 The court first explained that it would refuse
to regulate use of the lake in the absence of proof that the right to fish
on it was being "materially injured or destroyed."163

While Menzies

produced proof that the fish caught on Lake Rannoch at the time of the
suit were generally smaller in size than those caught years before, he
did not produce evidence that fewer fish were caught on the lake at the
time of suit as compared to some prior point.164 The court found that
proof of the reduced weight of individual fish did not satisfy plaintiff's
burden of proof.165
Utentworth is significant for its recognition of the emerging

Scottish doctrine of free access, and its dicta with regard to what
exactly judicial regulation of that free access might look like.
Although the court denied Menzies' request that it regulate the surface

1 56.
1 5 7.
1 5 8.

Wentworth, ( 1 90 1 ) 3 S.C. at 94 1 .

Id at 94 1 , 943.
Id at 943.

1 59. Only the right to fish for trout was questioned in �ntoorth. Scottish law
provides specially for rights to fish for salmon. Id at 955 . The right of salmon fishing in
Scotland is a separate feudal estate. Id Thus, unlike that of trout fishing, the right of salmon
fishing does not flow merely from ownership of lands bordering a river or lake. 3 WALKER,
supra note 1 2 1 , at 1 13.
1 60. Wentoorth, ( 1 90 1 ) 3 S.C. at 942.
1 6 1 . The Court of Session is the highest ranking civil court of appeal located in
Scotland. MAxWELL, supra note 1 1 9, at 3. It is not, however, the court of last resort for
Scottish cases. Appeals from the Court of Session could be heard by the House of Lords
(which maintained a physical location only in England) until 2005, and by a new Supreme
Court after that. See MAxWELL, supra note 1 19, at 262-63.
1 62 . �ntworth, ( 1 90 1 ) 3 S.C. at 94 1 .
1 63 . Id at 955.
1 64. Id at 956.
1 65 .

Id
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use of the riparian landowners, the case serves a s yet another judicial
recognition that Macdonald set out a "joint right" and that courts may
need to interfere in the case of abuse o f the right.166 The Jlentworth
court noted that the j oint right articulated in Macdonald was
"consistent with the dicta on the subj ect in other cases," namely
Mackenzie. 161 Thus, by the time of Jlentworth, the highest Scottish
civil court considered the rule of free access to be the law in Scotland.
And though the majority did not reach the question of what type
of judicial regulation it might provide for the owners of Lake Rannoch,
Lord M'Laren's concurrence espoused a theory of just what sort of
judicial regulation a court could undertake. 168

M'Laren argued that,

even if Menzies could have shown an injury sufficient to necessitate
judicial regulation, the relief he sought would not have been possible.169
M' Laren read Macdonald to provide all riparian landowners with
equal rights of use over the entire surface of the lake, with no regard to
their percentage of riparian landowner ownership.110 The Jlentworth
court, therefore, could not have made "an order allocating the use of
[Lake Rannoch] in proportion to 'frontage'," as Menzies requested.111
Such a decision, in M'Laren's view, would not have comported with
the House of Lords' judgment in Macdonald112
M' Laren 's concurrence, then, is more than just a recognition of a
strong Scottish rule of free riparian landowner access to the entire
surface of nonnavigable lakes. It is an amplification of it to provide for
equal percentage (and not merely frontage-based) use. The importance
of that amplification, in this context, is that it serves to illustrate how
well entrenched the basic rule of free riparian landowner access to the
entirety of lake surfaces was by the time of Jlentworth.
After the decision in H-entwoJth, the new and unusual Scottish
doctrine was

well-recognized

and

its

parameters

nearly

fully

developed. The rule of free access was born, not of the civil law, but of
the courts of Scotland.113
1 66.

Id at 947.

167. Id (citing Mackenzie v. Bankes, ( 1 878) 3 App. Cas. 1 324 (H.L.) (appeal taken
from Scot.)).
1 68.
169.

Id at 957.
Id

1 70.
171.

See 1d
Id

1 72.

Id

1 73. If the rule of free access stems from Scottish roots, can we not call it a "civil law
rule"? What does it mean to be a "civil law rule"? The question is one to which there is no
clear answer. But the simplest one, I think, is that to be a "civil law rule " the rule must come
from a civilian source. As a j urisdiction with a civilian (or, at least, a mi ed) legal system, but

�
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This series of Scottish cases highlights an important point about
the origin of the Scottish rule of surface access. To appreciate fully the
rationale behind the Scottish rule, it is necessary to first understand a
bit about

the

Scottish rule

of riparian

landowner

access

on

nonnavigable rivers. Though it seems counterintuitive, the Scots did
not allow the free access to riparian landowners along a nonnavigable
river that they provided to those on a nonnavigable lake.174 Because the
running waters of a river are generally viewed as more transient and
incapable of containment or possession than those of a lake, there may
be some rational justification for providing free access to riparian
landowners on a river while denying it to those on a lake . Any logical
grounding for the opposite rule-free riparian landowner access on
lakes, but not on rivers-is untenable.

Yet the Scots have adopted

exactly such a rule.
This just

emphasizes

the

importance

Mackenzie, and ltentworth decisions.

of the

Macdonald,

The series demonstrates that

the rule of free access to the surface of nonnavigable lakes has its
genesis nowhere but in the Scottish legal system, and that it was born
out of the Scots' desire to simplify the problems of boundary
demarcation and enforcement on those water bodies.115
Essentially, the Scots adopted and developed the rule solely as a
matter of convenience. It is neither a rule borrowed from a civil law
source nor a rule with its primary basis in any civilian notions of the
ownership or use of water. It was both generated and elaborated upon
by the Scots, merely as a convenient distortion of the typical rules of
surlace access.
C.

The American Incorporation ofthe Scottish Interpretation
While the precise parameters of the rule of free access were still

being articulated and narrowed in Scotland, the doctrine made its way
to the United States. The door to its application here, surprisingly, was
opened by the United States Supreme Court in its

1891

decision in

without a civil code, Scotland's law is civilian only insofar as it is Roman. See S.A. Bayitch,
Codification in Modem Times, in CIVIL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD, supra note 3, at 17779; F.H. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 26 (Greenwood Press 1977)
(1955) . And Roman law provided no rule of free access, nor any basis for such a rule. See
discussion supra Part 11.C. l .c. This is an idiosyncratic Scottish generation, not a "civilian"
rule.
174. See Mackenzie v. Bankes, (1878) 3 App. Cas. 1324, 1338-40 (H.L.) (appeal taken
from Scot.).
175. Id at 1338.
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Jordan. 1 16 Interestingly, Hardin did not set out a general rule

of free access to the surface of a nonnavigable lake for recreational
use. Indeed, surface access was not even the issue under consideration
in Hardin. Rather, the Court was called upon to determine the bounds
of bed ownership

for

litigants with

property bordering

on

a

nonnavigable lake. 1 11 But loose dicta by the Hardin Court regarding
recreational use imported the Scottish rule into the United States and
compounded the problem by incorrectly suggesting a civilian source
for the rule.118

The mistake has since persisted in a long line of

jurisprudence. 1 19

In short, the considerable confusion of American

courts with regard to the authorities supporting and the source of the
rule of free riparian landowner access was born of the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Hardin.
1.

The Hardin Decision
The plaintiff in Hardin brought an ej ectment action, seeking a

declaration that she was the rightful possessor of a tract of land
bordering and underneath a portion of the waters of a small lake.180
Plaintiff's title described her ownership to extend "along the margin of
the lake";181 thus, her title did not describe her ownership as including
any portion of the bed of the l ake.

Plaintiff sought to oust the

defendant from an area of land covered by water, and, thus, outside of
the land strictly described in the plaintiff's title, but still between the
plaintiff's dry boundary and the center of the lake. In support of this
attempt, plaintiff argued that as a riparian landowner, the boundaries of
her ownership did not stop at the water's edge, but rather, extended to
the center of the lake.182 In essence, the issue in Hardin was "the effect
of [the plaintiff's] title in reference to the lake and the bed of the lake
in front of the lands actually described in the grant."183 In other words,
does a landowner with a title establishing ownership of land abutting a
1 76 .

1 40 U.S. 3 7 1 , 3 7 1 ( 1 89 1 ).

1 7 7.

Id at 372.
Sct' 1d at 390-9 1 .

I 7X.

A number of j urisdictions that have considered the question have either
referenced the Hardin decision or used the inept label "civil law rule." See, e.g., Wehby v.
Turp111. 7 1 0 So. 2d 1 243, 1 249 (Ala. 1 998); Ace Equip. Sales, Inc. v. Buccino, 869 A.2d 626,
634-35 (Conn. 2005); Lanier v. Ocean Pond Fishing Club, Inc., 322 S.E.2d 494, 496 (Ga.
1 984): Beacham v. Lake Zurich Prop. Owners Ass'n, 526 N.E.2d 1 54, 1 5 6 5 7 (Ill . 1988);
Sanders v. De Rose, 1 9 1 N.E. 33 1 , 333 (Ind. 1 934 ).
1 80. Hardin, 1 40 U.S. at 372.
1 8 1 . Id at 374.
1 82 . Id at 379.
1 8 3. Id at 380.

1 79 .

-
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lake also own a portion of the bed of that lake (in the absence of
specific title to the bed in another)?
The Supreme Court first noted that ownership of some portion of
the bed of a water body, even where a landowner's title prescribes
specific boundaries that include no portion of the bed, is not
inconsistent with general principles of property or boundary law. 184
Survey lines that reference a water body exist "not for the purpose of
limiting the title of the grantee to such" boundaries, but to "ascertain[]
the exact quantity of the upland to be charged for."185 Thus, it is typical
for a surveyor to reference a water body as a property's boundary line
merely for convenience and the necessity of establishing some stable
line, all the while intending that the true boundary be within the
waters.186
Finding no precedent for a determination of the bounds of
ownership on a nonnavigable lake, the Supreme Court turned to prior
jwisprudence involving rivers and streams.181 The English common
law clearly provided that landowners with property bordering on
nonnavigable rivers also owned the bed of the water body, up to the
thread of the stream, even where their titles described the river as the
bounds of their ownership.188 The Court then noted that circumstances
in the United States (particularly in Illinois, the state around which the
Hardin dispute centered) were not so different as to justify a different
rule from that applied in England.189 Moreover, the Court found no
reason to distinguish between rivers and lakes for the purpose of
providing a rule of title to the bed. 190 In either case, the water
"constitutes one of the advantages of [the land's] situation, and a
material part of its value, and enters largely into the consideration for
acquiring [the land]. Hence the presumption is that a grant of land
thus bounded is intended to include the contiguous land covered by
water."191 The Court, therefore, held that the plaintiff owned the
portion of the bed of the lake extending from the dry border, as
described in her title, out to the center of the lake.
·

192

1 84. See id at 379.
1 85. Id at 380.
1 86. Id; see also FRANK E. CLARK, CLARK ON SURVEYING AND BOUNDARIES § 25. 14, at
867 (Walter G. Robillard & Lane J. Bouman eds., 6th ed. 1992) (expanding upon the process
of surveying property).
1 87. Hardin, 140 U.S. at 387-88.
1 88. Id
1 89. Id at 386.
1 90. See id at 391.
1 9 1 . Id
1 92. Id at 401 -02.
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Importing the Scottish Rule Through Dicta

The problem in Hardin is that, in discussing the rule of ownership
of the bed of rivers, particularly while trying to explain that the English
rule regarding rivers should also be applied to determine ownership of
the bed of lakes, the Court describes Scottish law.193 The comparison
is, at first, helpful, because it serves to explain why the English bed
ownership rule was never extended, in that country, to lakes:

There

simply are not enough lakes or ponds of substantial size to prompt
litigation.194
rivers.195

The majority of sizeable interior waters in England are

Scotland, on the other hand, has a well-developed law

regarding private ownership of lakes, necessitated by their prevalence
there.196 The Hardin Court, then, appropriately notes that the Scottish
rule of ownership of nonnavigable lake beds is that multiple riparian
landowner proprietors own "the space inclosed by lines drawn from
the boundaries of each property usque ad mediwn fl1um aquae [up to
the middle of the streamr1 being deemed appurtenant to the land of
that proprietor, exactly as in the common case of a river."198
The sentence and citations immediately following that legal
principle, though, are what wreak havoc. The Court continues:

But as to the rights of boating, fishing and fowling . . . [t]hese are to be
enjoyed over the whole water space by all the riparian proprietors in
common, subject (if need be) to judicial regulation. [Citing Mackenzie
v. Bankes, ( 1 878) 3 . App. Cas. 1 324, 1338 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Scot.).] See, also, to the same purport, Burge, Col. & For. Law, vol. 3,
p. 425; Justinian's Digest, lib. 8, tit. 3, f 23, § I . And centuries before
Justinian, Cicero spoke of the many lands, houses, lakes, ponds, places
and possessions confiscated by Sylla and conferred upon his own
favorites. Agra. Law, Orat. 3, c. 2:7. 199
The Court's description of the Scottish rule allowing riparian
landowners mutual access to the entire surface of a lake for
recreational purposes is certainly unnecessary to its resolution of the
controversy at hand. The dispute hinged upon ownership of a portion
of the bed of a lake, not upon whether the parties were each entitled to
access the surface of the body. But the Court's mention of the Scottish

See 10. at 39 1 .
Id at 388.
1 95 . Id
1 96. Id at 390.
1 93 .

1 94.

1 97 .
1 98.
1 99 .

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1544 (6th ed. l 990).

Hardin, 1 40 U.S. at 390.
Id (internal quotations omitted).
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rule served to import that line of cases into the United States,
unnecessarily, and with no explanation of the rationale behind or the
soundness of the rule.
b.

Compounding the Problem with Erroneous Citation

Moreover, to the extent the Hardin Court cites the works of
Burge, Justinian, and Cicero to support the proposition that riparian
landowner ownership grants the privilege of use for boating or fishing
on the entire surface of the lake, such citation is simply incorrect. The
Court compounds the problem of importing the idiosyncratic Scottish
rule by suggesting that other authorities support such a rule.

To the

extent the authorities the Court mentions are civilian-and thus imply
the existence of a civilian source for the rule of free access-the
erroneous citation is particularly egregious.
British jurist William Burge 's work on late eighteenth- and early
nineteenth-century colonial law simply states that "[l]akes surrounded
by grounds of various proprietors are common property."200 While this
might be authority for the idea that multiple landowners with titles
described as bounding on a lake own the bed "in common" to the
center, it does not suggest that colonial law gave each riparian
landowner proprietor free access to the entire surface of the body. The
two issues are independent,201 and Burge did not speak to the latter.
The section of Justinian's

Digest

cited by the Hardin Court

provides even less support for a rule of mutual riparian landowner
access to the entire surface of a lake.
rules of predial servitudes,202 the

In defining and detailing the

Digest

provides:

"If there is a

permanent lake on your land, a servitude of boating across it can be
created, to allow access to a neighboring estate."203 The passage in no
way suggests that surface access to the entire lake exists in all riparian
200.

3 WILLIAM

BURGE

,

COMMENTARIES

ON COLONIAL AND FOREIGN LAWS:

GENERALLY, AND IN THEIR CONFLICT WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH THE LAW OF ENGLAND

425
(1 838).
20 1 . Lord Hale's prominent treatise on English water law, for instance, explains that
"[ f]resh rivers . . . do of common right belong to the owners of the soil adjacent," but that this
"common right'' means only that multiple riparian landowners on a river own its bed to the
center line. Matthew Hale, De Jure Mans, in A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW
RELATING THERETO 370 (Stuart A. Moore ed., 3d ed. 1888). The "common right" has no
bearing on surface rights. Indeed, Hale noted that a riparian landowner would hold the right
to fish over the entire surface of a river only if he owned the land on both sides of it. Id
202. Predial servitudes are akin to easements in the common law. WW BUCKLAND &
ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, ROMA N LAW & COMMON LAW: A COMPA RISON IN OUTLINE 127 (2d ed.
1952).
203. DIG. 8.3.2 3 . 1 (Paul, Sabinus, bk. 1 6).
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landowners. To the contrary, the suggestion that a servitude

can be

crel1ted to provide such a right indicates that the position of the Digest

was that no mutual right of surface access existed in the absence of the
creation of a servitude.
Cicero's orations on Roman law and politics likewise lend no
credence to the mutual surface access rule the Hardin court draws into
American jurisprudence. In delivering an oration on the need for the
development of and debate over a body of Roman agrarian law around
the year 62 B.C., Cicero sought to stem criticism that he opposed
agrarian law because it would deprive him of property granted him and
other elites by the then-ruling Roman general, Lucius Cornelius
Sylla.�°" Arguing that Sylla gave more to private parties than any prior
ruler, Cicero asked his listeners to remember what "has been given, or
assigned or sold, or granted by public authority, whether lands, or
houses, or lakes, or marshes, or sites, or properties ."205

This is

obviously no authority for any rule of access to the surface of a lake.
At most-stretching the meaning nearly to its breaking point-it
might be considered authority for the idea that lakes were susceptible
of private ownership (by grant from the political authority of the time)
as early as 62 B. C.
Of course, it is possible that the Court meant to cite these
authorities in support of its prior point:

in the absence of any title

documents indicating otherwise, riparian landowners take the bed of a
lake to the center.

It would, at least, be easier to characterize the

comments of Burge and Cicero as supporting that point, though even
that requires an extremely generous interpretation. The placement of
the citation immediately after a discussion of the Scottish right of full
surface use in all riparian landowners belies that intent though. And
regardless of the Hardin Court's intent in citing Burge, Justinian, and
Cicero, subsequent American j udicial decisions have interpreted the
opinion to stand as authority for the proposition that a rule of full
surface access stems from the civil law.206
c.

Ignoring Other Relevant Roman Authorities

Final ly, the Supreme Court ignored relevant Roman authorities in
favor of erroneous citation to Burge, one provision of Justinian's

Digest.. and Cicero. The Court was clearly looking for some Roman
204.

2 CICERO, THE ORATIONS

trans., George
205.
206.

Bell & Sons 1 890).

OF MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO 257 (C.D. Yonge B.A. ed.,

Id at 259.
See. e.g., Wehby v. Turpin, 7 1 0 So. 2d 1243, 1 249 (Ala. 1 998).
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source for the rule of free access; otherwise, it would not have
bothered to cite the works of Justinian and Cicero. But it failed to fully
consider the quintessential Roman law authorities.

Had the Court

properly considered Roman law, it would have concluded that nothing
there supports the Scottish rule of free access.

The Hardin Court's

failure to properly consider relevant Roman law merely pronounces its
mistake in citation. Without a full and accurate discussion of Roman
law, the discussion of the Scottish cases and the erroneous c itations
leave the reader-and left a number of American courts-with the
flawed impression that the rule of free access is one that stems from
the civil law.
The paramount sources of Roman law-Justinian's

Diges�

the

previously discussed compilation of the writings of ancient Roman
jurists,201 and Justinian's

Institutes,

a sixth-century textbook of Roman

law aimed at law students208-say nothing specific about a riparian
landowner's right to access the surface of a nonnavigable lake for
recreational purposes.

In fact, Justinian's Digest and Institutes say

very little about water at all.209 Nevertheless, they are considered the
Some even argue that the

foundation of all modem water law.210
far

Romans

exceeded

any

modem

society

in terms

of their

understanding of the important issues and in their ability to develop
responsive legal principles surrounding water.211
At the time of the preparation of the

Digest and Institutes,

there

were, of course, no jet-skis or motorboats; even with more archaic
devices, water use as "recreation" was virtually unheard of.

Other

nonconsumptive uses of water were important to the Romans though.
Fishing (along with boating, for this purpose) and bathing were of
1
particular concern.2 2 So it is that the Digest and Institutes contain just
a few provisions that arguably relate to use of the surface of water
207. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
208. MOUSOURAKJS, supra note 58, at 390.
209. See ROMAN WATER LAW, supra note 6, § 1 0, at 25-26.
2 1 0. ''All the Civil Law of recent centuries concerning water comes from the old
. ." Id § 2 , at 16.
Roman Law
211.
.

.

It will surprise any one who reads the translation of the Roman water law to see
how perfectly and fully they understood the whole question. They had worked out
every problem, and we may safely say that they understood the subject as well as
we do to-day, and no one can say that the old Romans did not bring to their law of
water a common sense and equity not exceeded by our courts to-day.
Id § 9, at 240.

2 12. See, e.g., THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 2.1 .2 (Thomas Cooper ed., John s.
.

Voorhies 1 852) [hereinafter INSTITUTES].
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bodies.213 Not one of these provisions lends any support to the idea of
free access to the surface of a nonnavigable lake by all riparian
landowners.
The

sections

of

the

Digest

and

Institutes

relating

to

nonconsumptive uses of waterways might be collected under three
basic headings. First, there are provisions laying out the fundamental
principles of ownership and use of all water bodies, including rivers
and the sea.214 Second, there are particular provisions regarding use of
rivers, especially for fishing.215

And third, there are a few scant

provisions speaking of lakes.216
The basic principles underlying the framework of Roman water
law can be found in Justinian's Institutes, section 2. 1 . 1 :
Things common to mankind by the law of nature, are the air, nmning
water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea; no man therefore

is prohibited from approaching any part of the seashore, whilst he
abstains from damaging farms, monuments, edifices, etc. which are not
in common as the sea is.211

The tenet that there are some things, including "running water" and
"the sea," which are not susceptible of private ownership is carried
forward in the modem law of almost every civilian nation.218 Indeed, it
has long been the common law of England as well.219 Both traditions
recognize that the transient and uncontainable nature of the waters of
the high sea and those flowing in rivers simply does not lend itself to
concepts of ownership.220 Thus, these waters are "common things,"�2 1
owned by no one and subject to free use by everyone.222 Landowners
with property bordering on the sea or on rivers, of course, are included.

213. See infra notes 214-2 1 7, 223-226, 228-230 and accompanying text.
214. See, e.g., INSTITUTES, supm note 212, at 2 . 1 . l .
215. See, e.g., id at 2. 1 .2; DIG. 43. 14.l (illpian, Edict, bk. 68); DIG. 43. 1 2 . 1 (Ulpian,
Edict, bk. 68).
216. See, e.g., DIG. 43. 14. 1 (Ulpian, Edict, bk. 68); DIG. 8.3.23. l (Paul, Sabinus, bk.
1 5).
217. �STITUTES, supra note 212, at 2. 1 . 1 ; see also DIG. 1 .8.2.1 (Marcian, Institutes,
bk. 3) ("And mdeed by natural law the following belong in common to all men: air, flowing
water, and the sea . . . . ).
2 18. See 2 A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CNIL LAW TREATISE: PROPERTY
38-42
(4th ed. 2001 ) (discussing French, Louisianan, German, and Greek law).
2 19. JOSlillA GETZLER, A HrSTORY OF WATER RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW 1
75 (2004).
220. Id at 1 74-75; BUCKLAND & MCNAIR, supra note 202, at 97.
22 � . See �'.'"· Crv. CODE ANN. art. 449 (2005); WARE, supra note 6,
§ 395, at 1 4 1-42
(translating provisions of the early Spanish Siete Partidas).
222. See, e.g., LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 449 (2005).
.

"
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Under these most basic Roman water law principles, they have access
to the entirety of the surface of the sea or river on which they border.223
The Romans went even further in protecting the rights of the
people to make nonconsumptive uses of rivers.

Justinian's

Institutes

expressly recognized the right of fishing in rivers to be a right shared
by all men. 224

As a corollary to that right came the obligation of

landowners along a river to refrain from using any force to prohibit
members of the public from making use of the river, or from acting in
a way that would otherwise impede navigation. 225 And the obligation
of the riparian landowner went beyond merely interfering with
navigation; the landowner was also required to suffer use of his bank
26
his private property-incidental to that navigation.2
Again, if such
rights to navigate, fish in, and use the banks of a river were held by the
general public at Roman law, riparian landowners, as members of that
public, certainly held at least these rights.
The Romans did not extend the same protection of public use to
lakes, though. At Roman law, lakes were not common things. They
were distinguished from rivers and the high seas-things insusceptible
of private ownership by their nature.227 Lakes, on the other hand, were
capable of being privately owned, and the public's rights to use the
waters of a lake for fishing or any other purpose extended only to
public lakes.228 Private lakes were outside the domain of public use.
Thus, Roman citizens were not entitled to fish in others' private lakes.
Moreover, as previously mentioned, the Digest says nothing about
the rights of riparian landowners sharing borders on a nonnavigable
lake-as opposed to the general public-to fish and boat over its entire
surface.229 But it strongly suggests that these riparian landowners were
not entitled to free access to the entirety of the surface: "If there is a
permanent lake on your land, a servitude of boating across it can be
created, to allow access to a neighboring estate."230 The need to create a
servitude allowing riparian landowners access to neighboring estates

223. See DIG. 1 .8.4 (Marcian, Institutes, bk. 3) ("No one, therefore, is prohibited from
going on to the seashore to fish . . . . ).
224. INSTITIITES, supra note 2 1 2, at 2 . 1 .2 ("Rivers and ports are public; hence the right
of fishing in a port, or in rivers are in common.").
225 . DIG. 43 . 1 4.l (Ulpian, Edict, bk. 68).
226. Id at 43. 1 2 . 1 (Ulpian, Edict, bk. 68).
227. See BUCKLAND & MCNAIR, supra. note 202, at 97.
�
28. DIG. 43. 1 4. 1 .2 (Ulpian, Edict, bk. 68) ("If the [lake] should be private, the
.
mterd1ct [not to use force against a person navigating the body] does not apply.").
229. See supra notes 216-2 1 7, 223, 225-226, 228 and accompanying text.
230. DIG. 8.3.23. 1 (Paul, Sabinus, bk. 1 5).
"
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simply would not exist i f all riparian landowners held a right to use the
surface of the lake on which they bordered.
Nothing in the

Digest or Institutes

specifically gives, or even

suggests, that there exists in a landowner with property bordering on a
nonnavigable lake the right to access and use its entire surface for
fishing, boating, bathing, or any other purpose. That Roman law did
support the existence of those rights on rivers is inapposite. The waters
of a river, as "running waters," have long been distinguished from the
more contained, possibly even stagnant, waters of a lake. Thus, while
the entirety of the surface waters of a river were, at Roman law, subject
to public use, and, therefore, the use of the riparian landowners as well,
the waters of a lake were not subject to this same use.

Plainly, an

analysis of Roman law just does not yield any support for the
proposition that riparian landowners share the mutual right of free
access to the surface of nonnavigable lakes.231
The Hardin Court should have come to this same conclusion in
analyzing the one provision of Justinian's

Digest it did cite.

The Court

did engage in at least some study of Roman law to support its dicta
regarding surface access. But had it considered Roman law more fully,
it should have concluded that Roman law does not support the Scottish
rule.
The Hardin Court wmecessarily imported the Scottish doctrine of
free access, which is contrary to traditionally held notions of the
meaning of private ownership, as embodied in

cujus est solum.

The

importation occurred with no critical analysis, and through dicta. m

23 1 . If one doubts the efficacy of an analysis of Roman law to prove any conclusions
about the "civilian" heritage of a given legal rule, see ROMAN WATER LAW, supra note 6, § 2,
at 16 (''The basis of all the Civil Law which comes to any state . . . whether directly or
indirectly, is the law of imperial Rome."), one need only turn to an analysis of the substantive
water law of any of the great number ofjurisdictions living under the civil law. As discussed

supra. text accompanying notes 1 1 2-1 14, the principle cujus est solwn has retained its place in
the civilian tradition through the centuries and remains to this day a codified principle in
France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Argentina, and Japan. And while some civilian jurisdictions
still admit of an exception to that principle in favor of free use of "running waters," which
cannot be privately owned, see, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 450 (2005), they do not allow public,
or even mutual riparian landowners, access to the surface of nonnavigable lakes. See J.C.
Senter, Jr., Comment, Ownership ofthe Beds ofNavigable Lakes, 21 TuL. L. REv.

(1947).
232.

454, 454

Although it is the duty of courts ofjustice to decide questions of fact on principle if
they can, they must take care in such formulation of principles to limit themselves
to th: require?1ents of the case in hand. That is to say, they must not lay down
.
pru:ic1ples "".
hich are not required for the due decision of the particular case, or
w
hich are wider than is necessary for this purpose.
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That misstep was then multiplied by erroneous citation and incomplete
consideration of the sources of the Scottish rule, which is especially
problematic for the misimpression it gives about the origins and
history of the rule.

In any event, with

the Supreme Court

Hardin,

opened the door to a rule of free access. Appellate courts around the
country soon came calling.
Subsequent Judicial Application of the Hardin Dicta

2.

The mistake made in Hardin quickly proved to be an influential
one.

State

nonnavigable

courts
lakes

resolving
searched

disputes over
far

and wide

considered the Hardin dicta sufficient.233

surface
for

access

precedent,

to
and

A Texas appellate court

seeking to resolve a 1 935 dispute among riparian landowners over
fishing on a nonnavigable lake, for example,

found Hardin an

authority on the question.234 The Texas court cited Hardin in a manner
telling of the quick infiltration of its dicta:
It may be conceded as a general proposition . . . that . . . a riparian

landowner whose land abuts on a nonnavigable lake . . . impliedly owns
the land under the water to the center of the lake and that all riparian
owners whose lands abut on such a lake have a right to the j oint use of
the entire lake for fishing and boating.235

Thus, Hardin was generally accepted as having promulgated a rule of
free access by 1 935.
Shortly afterward, that rule was being called a civil law rule. In a

1 959 decision, the Florida Supreme Court noted that ''under the
common law doctrine only the owner could use the water overlying his
fee, while under the doctrine of the civil law the whole lake could be
used by any owner of a part of the bottom subject, of course, to the
rights of those in like situation."236 The false labels have been carried

EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE : THE PHlLOSOPHY AND METHOD OF THE LAW 433 (rev.
ed. 1 978) (quoting John Salmond, The Theory ofJudicial Precedents, 1 6 L.Q. R.Ev. 376, 388
(1 900)).
233. While an appellate court is certainly free to reject the application of dicta or to
view it as merely persuasive authority, the danger is that "many judges will be disinclined to
examine prior decisions alleged to be relevant with razor-blade sharpness and discernment in
order to determine whether the principle laid down by the prior court was, in the exact form
in which it was phrased, truly necessary for the determination of the case." Id at 435; see

K.�.

al�o
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS Sruoy 67-69 ( 1 960)
(discussmg the role of precedent in a judge's decision).
234. Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett, 88 S.W2d 127, 1 3 0 (Tex. Civ. App. 1 935).
235. Id
236.

Duval v. Thomas, 1 14 So. 2d 79 1 , 793 (Fla. 1959) (internal citations omitted).

TULANE LA WREVI E W

938

[Vol. 80:90 1

forward and persist even today, with the Connecticut Supreme Court's

2005 Buccino decision serving as the most recent example.237
Perhaps most disturbing though is the effe�t the Hardin error and
its subsequent heralding as a civil law rule have had on judicial
decision-making.

A few courts have considered the potential rules

without regard to their labels, and apparently with due regard to their
policies and effects.238 But others have adopted the so-called common
law rule merely for its purported origin. The Alabama Supreme Court,
for example, in itehby

v.

Turpin, was called upon to determine the

surface access rights of riparian landowners on an artificial lake.239
The court explained the civil law rule, but rejected it in favor of a rule
of restricted access.240 The superficial rationale with which the court
supported its decision highlights' the real problem with the Hardin
error. The itehby court first noted that "Alabama is a common law
state" and then concluded that, as a result, it was "bound to follow the
majority common law rule."241
The

itehby court's questionable rationale for adopting the
common law rule shows the need to rectify the mistake made years
ago-beginning with the Scottish line of free access cases and
continuing with Hardin and its progeny. Courts should certainly strive
to solve their litigants' problems with a thorough examination of all
possible solutions.

The

itehby court should not be faulted for
considering rules of both free and restricted access. But appellate
courts, including itehby and Buccino can, and should, be faulted for
lazy reliance on labels that are incorrect. There is, in fact, no civil law
rule of surface access that differs from the purported common law
rule. Courts must begin recognizing that and issuing opinions that
reflect a truly reasoned decision as to what they believe is the most
desirable rule of riparian landowner surface access.

237. Ace Equip. Sales, Inc. v. Buccino, 869 A.2d 626, 634-35 (Conn. 2005).
238. See, e.g., Beach v. Hayner, 1 73 N.W. 487, 488-89 (Mich. 1 9 1 9); Johnson v.
Seifert, 100 N.W.2d 689, 695-96 (Minn. 1960).
239. 710 So. 2d 1 243, 1 246 (Ala. 1998).
240. Id at 1 247-49.
241 . Id at 1 249. The Court of Appeals of South Carolina recently issued a similarly
careless decision in Mites Mill Colony, Inc. v. Williams, 609 S.E.2d 8 1 1 , 820 (S.C. Ct. App.
2005). The court adopted the "common law rule;' after noting that South Carolina "generally
hews closely to the common law" and that its courts "when confronted with a decision
whether to follow a common law approach or follow a civil law rule . . .-absent any other
considerations-would generally follow the common law rule." Id

2006]
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DEBUNKING THE MYTH
It is time for this ancient false dichotomy to finally be laid to rest.

The need to stop the persistence of the incorrect labels may seem, at
first, superficial. The problem is solved, after all, by merely changing
the nomenclature. The rule allowing free riparian landowner surface
access should no longer be called a civil law rule.

It must be done,

though, for it is an important step towards preserving judicial integrity
and fostering greater understanding of the differences between the
common and civil law systems.
A.

Recogmzing That � Are Truly Children ofthe Same Parents
Despite what the labels of common law rule and civil law rule

suggest, the truth is that there is no difference between the systems
insofar as a rule of surface access for riparian landowners goes. Both
systems' rules can be traced to the same ancestor:

a Latin maxim of

civilian origin. So, both traditions follow the civil law rule. Or, if you
prefer, the civil law rule is the conunon law rule, and vice versa. The
rule governing surface access for riparian landowners on nonnavigable
water bodies in both the common and civil law traditions comes from
the doctrine of cujus est solum, as articulated by ancient commentators
on Roman law.
There is, then, no civil law rule of free surface access to
nonnavigable water bodies.

The civil law rule was and is cujus est

solum. And under that rule, a riparian landowner on a nonnavigable
lake may make use of the water's surface only above bed he owns; any
other unauthorized use is an interference with his fellow riparian
landowner's right to exclusive dominion and control over his land-a
trespass.
It is true that Scotland has a rule of free access. But to call the
rule invented by the Scots "civilian" is a mistake, and a serious one, for
it serves to perpetuate a myth about the difference between common
and civil law systems that is false. We should view the Scottish rule
for what it is:

a self-generated solution to a perceived problem that

plagues all jurisdictions trying to resolve the question of surface access
by riparian landowners-that of articulating a rule that can be
realistically complied with, given the difficulties of determining
precise boundaries when water is involved.

The Scots chose free

surface access for riparian landowners as the solution to the problem.
The solution is certainly a pragmatic, and perhaps even laudable one,
but is not a civilian one. It is directly contrary to the ancient civilian

[Vol. 80:901
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principle of cujus est solum and, indeed, requires one to set aside that
doctrine (at least in this context) altogether.
B

A Modest Proposal" Renaming the Rules
There is a simple solution to the problem. We must just begin

using terminology that properly characterizes the rules. We might call
the rule allowing free access "the Scottish rule," and the rule giving

a

riparian landowner exclusive dominion of the waters overlying his bed
''the Roman rule." We might refer to them as the "traditional" and
"modern" rules,
dominion."

or the rules

of "free

access" and "exclusive

Nearly anything will do, anything, that is, but the inept

and erroneous labels, "civil law rule" and "common law rule."
C.

The Necessity ofRecognizing and Correcting the Error
This is not, though, merely a petty point of semantics. The real

problem with the erroneous labels is twofold. First, the error stands as
an obstacle to judicial transparency. Without transparency, some of the
most

significant

values

of judicial

decision-making,

including

accessibility and consistency, fall. Judicial integrity is weakened in the
process.
Even more importantly, the erroneous labels say something about
the difference between the common and civil law systems that is
untrue.

The perceived-and flawed-notion of a difference on this

issue of water access is just one example of the perpetuation of the
myth that the true distinction between the systems

is in their

substantive legal rules. It is important that this misimpression be
corrected, because recognizing that the common and civil law are one
and the same, at least on this score, may help us get closer to
discovering and benefiting from our true differences.
1.

Fostering Judicial Transparency
Correcting the two-century-old error is important because the

error stymies judicial transparency, and, thus, integrity. Most scholars
agree that a court best serves the interests of justice when it not only
articulates its ultimate decision, but also details the logic behind and
reasons for that decision in an open manner.

242

Transparency is

242. See, e.g, Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administra tive State:
A Structural and Institutional Defense ofJudicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1239, 1 3 1 3 n.348 (2002) (''Although scholars agree on the value of judicial

transparency[,] they disagree over how best to achieve it.").

94 1

RIPARIAN MISCONCEPTION

2006]

necessary to make law fully accessible and, at least in common law
jurisdictions,243 to allow judicial decisions to effectively serve as
precedent.244 Moreover, values such as consistency and accountability
when courts do not
45
reasorung. 2
suffer

fully and accurately

describe their

•

All too often, though, courts issue opinions similar to those in
llehbj46 and

Buccino,241 relying on authorities and labels without a

critical analysis of their accuracy.248 Such judicial laziness is serious,
but its negative effects pale in comparison with those created by
"judicial reliance on . . . rhetoric to disguise interpretive priorities" or
policies. 249 W hichever misstep is being made by courts on the issue of
Courts

riparian landowner surface access, it deserves correction.

should choose to adopt whichever rule best serves the citizens of their
states, but to do so with a full exploration of those policies and an
acknowledgement of them as the basis for their decisions.

Relying,

243. The problem is less severe, at least in theory, in civilian jurisdictions, which do
not adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis. Civilian judges are not bound by a single judicial
decision, but only by jurisprudence

constante,

a long line of judicial decisions interpreting a

Kathryn Venturatos Lorio,

The Louisiana Civil Law

Tradition: Archaic or Prophetic in the Twenty-First Century.� 63

LA. L. REv. 1, 6 (2002) .

legislative provision in the same way.

Today though, "[t]here is an open clash between the civilian theory . . . Gurisprudence is only
a secondary source of law . . . ) and the realist's empirical observation that even a single
decision by the Supreme Court of Louisiana binds every lower court to follow it." Vernon

The French Connection and the Spanish Perception: Histoncal Debates
and Contemporary Evaluation ofFrench Influence on Louisiana CiVJ1 Law, 63 LA. L. REv.

Valentine Palmer,

1067, 1 1 1 8 n. 148 (2002).
244. See Gilbert S. Merritt, The Decision Making Process in Federal Courts of
Appeals, 5 1 Omo ST. L.J. 1385, 1 393-94 ( 1990); Molot, supra note 242, at 1321-22.
245. See Merritt, supra note 244, at 1 393-94; see also Bradley T. King, Note,

"Through Fault of Their 01¥11 "-Applying Bonner Mall s Extraordinary Circumstances Test
to Heightened Standard ofReview Clauses, 45 B.C. L. REv. 943, 947 (2004) ("(J]udicial
integrity is enhanced when courts apply uniform analytical frameworks consistently.").
246. Wehby v. Turpin, 710 So. 2d 1243, 1 249 (Ala. 1 998).

247.
248.

Ace Equip . Sales, Inc. v. Buccino, 869 A.2d 626, 634-35 (Conn. 2005).

[W]e learn from an early age to defer to the authority of parents and established
institutions . . . . We do not entirely lose that tendency when we grow up to be judges
who decide cases . . . . The less time we have to decide a case . . . the more pressure
there is to decide quickly and we may be less likely to analyze and reflect on the
condition and circumstances of the individual's case . . . . Such cases can become a
ritual in which the court searches quickly for a legal defense . . . without seriously
contemplating possible injustices to the individual party or other members of the
community. The need for haste may make the court search for "safe" rather than just
decisions and may push the process toward ritual rather than reflection.
Merritt,

supra note 244, at 1394-95.
Mo lot, supra note 242, at 1 322.

249.
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instead, on a false civil law-common law dichotomy hinders judicial
transparency, and thus judicial integrity.
2.

Properly Characterizing the Difference Between the Common
and Civil Law Systems
Many, both inside and outside the realm of the civil law world,

envision a major distinction between civil and common law systems.
Volumes could be, and have been, devoted to exposition of these
di:fferences.250

Yet our view of the gulf is becoming increasingly

nuanced in the twenty-first century. As common law systems become
more

systematized251

and civil

law

systems

more

focused

on

jurisprudence as an authoritative source of law,252 the two systems are
coming together more closely than one might guess. There certainly
remain many differences between the systems, but they are less stark
today than they once were.
The Alabama Supreme Court's decision in

Jtehby and the

Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Buccino, along with other
appellate opinions, are perpetuating an error of law that is outdated in
this new world. It encourages the common misconception that the gap
between the systems lies in their divergent substantive treatment of
particular legal issues. That is a position I find untenable today.
Some

recent

scholarly

commentary strives

to

explain the

difference between common and civil law systems as one of differing
priorities, or different moral and philosophical bents.

For example,

one writer remarked, in attempting to describe Louisiana's "mixed"
common and civil law system,253 that it "places more emphasis on the
rights of individuals as opposed to government."254 Likewise, another
scholar speaks of divergent "souls" or "spirits" in the two systems.255
250. A full discussion of these disparities is beyond the scope of this Article. For a
good explanation of some of the differences, and a recognition of the complexity and
impossibility of thoroughly addressing them in a work of any length, see JOHN HENRY
MERRYMAN, THE CNIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF
WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 149-50 (2d ed. 1 985). What follows, then, is an
intentionally simplistic discussion, more focused on what the differences are not than on what
they are.
25 1 . The promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is but one example
of the common law's increasing systematization. For an excellent comparison of the UCC to
''true" civilian codes, see William D. Hawkland, The Um'fonn Commercial Code and the
Civil Codes, 56 LA. L. REv. 23 1 , 23 1 -47 (1995).
252. See Palmer, supra note 243, at 1 1 1 8 n. 148.
253 . See Smith, supra note 3, at 1 0.
254. Steven Frederic Lachman, Should Mumcipalities Be Liable for Development
RclatedFlooding?, 4 1 NAT. RESOURCES J. 945, 952 n.22 (2001 )
255. Robert A. Pascal, Low'siana Civil Law and Its Study, 60 LA. L. REv. I , 3 ( 1 999).
.
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The "soul of the modem civil law" is said to be "dedicated to liberty,
equality, and fratemity."256 On the other hand, Robert Pascal wrote:
The Common Law . . . seems . . . to be very differently oriented. I see it
dominated even in this day by two factors, one its feudal origins, which
continue to be manifest strongly in the law of property . . . and the other,
its original sole other concern, that of providing such redress or remedy
as was necessary to maintain . . . peace, or to obviate civil disorder,
rather than of articulating

an

order for the maximum securing of

freedom, dignity, and cooperation. Each of these factors has resulted in
the Common Law's failure to respect human dignity, freedom, and
equality in the same degree as the civil law, and the second has resulted
in a failure of the Common Law to give as much respect to cooperative
action.257

Beyond the "soul" of the systems, scholars often argue a
fundamental distinction in substantive rules. A common law attorney
with considerable knowledge of the civil law remarked in the 1 950s,
for example, that "the leading differences" between the common and
civil

law

systems

are not

differences

in

sources
methodologies, "but in the concepts themselves."258

of law

or

The sphere of real property, in particular, is one in which the civil
law and common law systems are alleged to differ substantially. 259 The
divergence in the substantive rules of property between the two
systems-as is the divergence in fundamental values or philosophy (or
more metaphorically, if you prefer, "spirit or soul"}-is greatly
exaggerated. The gulf is viewed as so deep that it has prompted the
observation that "the civil law of property, which does have

an

internal

logic . . . does not easily correspond to anything known in the complex
common law of property, with its 'veritable jungle of concepts." '260

256. Id
257. Id at 3-4.
258. LAWSON, supm note 1 73, at 209.
259. See Ottavio Campanella, The Italian Legal Profession, 1 9 J. LEGAL PROF. 59, 60
( 1 994) ("The similarities between the civil-law systems and their differences with common
law systems are especially marked in . . the classifications and rules of what is traditionally
private law, having to do with . . . property . . . ." (quoting ALAN WATSON, THE MAK.ING OF
CIVIL LAW 1 ( 1 98 1))); Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in
Comparative Law and Economics, 14 INT'L R.Ev. L. & ECON. 3 , 9 ( 1994) (Property is "an area
of the law where most of the notable differences between the common law and the civil law
can be found."); Michael J. Reppas II, The Deflowenng ofthe Parthenon: A Legal and Moral
Analysis on JWJy the "Elgin Marbles" Must Be Retumed to Greece, 9 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 9 1 1 , 947-48 n.204 ( 1 999) ("The rules on property in a common law
country are vastly different from those of a 'civil Jaw' country . . . . ).
260. Jacques du Plessis, Common Law Influences on the Law of Contract and
UnjustifiedEmichment in Some MixedLegal Systems, 78 TUL. L. R.Ev. 2 1 9, 249 (2003).
.

"
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A historical look at the single legal concept presented in this
Article-that

of riparian

landowner

access to

the

surface

nonnavigable water bodies-is a useful exercise in comparison.

of
It is

just one of many concepts for which comparative historical study
serves to counter the myths about the differences between the common
law and the civil law. In fact, neither the substance of the private law
rule, nor the evidence of the "spirit" of the rule, evinces differs across
traditions.
The substance of this riparian landowner rule is the same in both
the civil and common law traditions.

Indeed, the rule used by both

"camps" was drawn from the same source.
systems,

cqjus est solum, then,

The rule of civil law

does "easily correspond" to something

in the common law; the rule of the "veritable jungle" that is the
common law is also the civilian-born

cujus est solwn!

In an area in

which the common and civil law systems are widely viewed to differ
substantially, a comparison of this riparian landowner access rule, at
least, tends to show the opposite.261 Close study of the development of
other civilian and Anglo-American legal concepts often will, I believe,
remind us of how "the same problems have occupied us all on both
sides of the channel; how our methodology has often been different
and how, despite the preceding observation, our final results have,
invariably, been analogous."262

The difference between the common

and the civil laws is "more than a set of different legal rules."263
Emphasis of this point is one small step toward showing that the
substantial difference between the common and civil law systems is
likewise not one of differing souls or spirits, at least not as that soul or
spirit is measured by the systems' respective commitment to values
such as fraternity, human dignity, freedom, and equality. This example
suggests that both systems rank those values identically. Fraternity and
freedom (which would presumably favor a rule allowing free access to
all neighboring riparian landowners) must yield to traditional notions
surrounding the landowner's right to exclusive dominion over his

26 1 . This is not to say, of course, that differences in the substantive rules of property
across systems do not exist. They, of course, do. For a detailed comparison of particular
rules of property in both systems, see James Gordley, The Common Law in the Twentieth
Century: Some Unf
inished Business, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1 8 1 5, 1859-69 (2000).
262. Basil Markesinis, Two Hundred }fats ofa Famous Code: Mat Should Vli' Be
Celebrating?, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J. 56 1 , 564 (2004).
263. MERRYMAN, supra note 250, at 1 50.

RIPAR IAN MISCONCEPTION

2006]

945

property. Neither system, in this context, fosters greater "cooperative
action." Both systems place an equal premium on individual rights.264
Are there substantial differences across systems? Absolutely.

I

submit, though, that the differences are not often in substance or in
striking different balances with respect to the above-described values.
A detailed exploration of such purported differences often shows them
to be "more false than true."265

I believe the more important

differences between the common and civil law systems are "subtler . . .
.

,,266

and more pervasive.

Shifting the focus away :from rumored substantive differences that
do not, in fact, exist will allow us to study and benefit :from these truly
substantial differences. Two hundred years after the creation of a rule
of :free riparian landowner access, it is time to acknowledge the source
of the rule, or more particularly, that there is no civil law rule which
departs from a common law rule.

The civil law and common law

nomenclature, at least as it relates to the substantive rules of riparian
landowner surface access, creates the mirage of a gulf between the
systems, when in fact no such gulf is present. It does us a disservice,
and for that, should be abandoned.

264. See Julian Hermida, Convergence of Civil Law and Common Law Contracts in
the Space Field, 34 H.K.L.J. 339, 343 (2004) ("Both . . . (systems] share similar fundamental
social objectives, which include the protection and encouragement of individual and personal
rights and are both enrolled in a liberal philosophy and conception of the world.").
265.

See Danielle Conway-Jones, Mongolia, Law Convergence, and the Third Era of

Globalization, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 63, 7 1 (2004).
266.

See MERRYMAN, supra note 250, at 1 50 (describing the historical and cultural

dim�nsions of the differences). Specifically, I believe the true differences are of style,
temunology, and a philosophy of how law is best articulated and responsive to change . See
Hermida, supra note 264, at 343.

